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FOURTH AMENDMENT GLOSS
Aziz Z. Huq*
Abstract
Conventional wisdom suggests that a constitutional right will constrain government actors.
But a right defined in terms of what the state routinely does would impose in practice no
brake on state action—and so seem pointless. Nevertheless, in defining Fourth
Amendment rights, the Supreme Court frequently draws on the practice of regulated
government actors to define the constitutional floor for police action. This Article is the first
to isolate and analyze this seemingly paradoxical judicial practice. It labels it “Fourth
Amendment gloss,” after an analogous mode of reasoning in separation-of-powers cases.
The Article’s first aim is descriptive—to catalog the various ways in which “gloss,” or
official practice, is deployed across the Court’s search and seizure case-law. This exercise
shows that many frequently exercised search and seizure powers have been constitutionally
defined in terms of official practice. The Article’s second aim is to ask whether judicial
reliance on such gloss can be justified. There are three general justifications for the use of
gloss as a source of law in constitutional interpretation. These can be called gloss as
acquiescence, gloss as Burkean wisdom, and gloss as settlement. A careful examination of
the empirical and theoretical contexts of the Fourth Amendment suggests, however, that
none of these three justifications can be extended to support gloss’s use as a way to define
lawful searches and seizure. If gloss persists today, therefore, it is for institutional and
ideological reasons—not because it is theoretically warranted. Given this conclusion, the
Article offers ways to limit the error costs associated with the use of Fourth Amendment
gloss.

* Frank and Bernice J. Greenberg Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School.
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Introduction
Constitutional rights supposedly constrain government actors.1 To restrain the state
in some meaningful way, a right must place out of lawful bounds some activities that
government would otherwise do, or else require some action that government would
otherwise abjure. The U.S. Constitution largely enumerates the first, negative, kind of right
against government interference.2 So to define those constitutional rights in terms of what
the government ordinarily does might seem an exercise in futility. After all, a right defined in
terms of ordinary state practice would engender no meaningful gain in liberty.3 Why, one
might plausibly wonder, would anyone bother to write down such a right in the first place?4
Under what circumstances, one might ask, would such a right likely be violated?
This Article concerns a zone of constitutional rights that disobey this seemingly
foundational presupposition. The Supreme Court frequently draws on the official practice of
regulated government actors as a source of Fourth Amendment law. I call this reliance on
official practice “Fourth Amendment gloss,” by analogy to the judicial practice of looking to
interbranch dynamics as a source of “historical gloss” in separation-of-powers disputes.5 A
first aim of this Article is descriptive: I want to isolate the significant role that gloss, or
official practice, plays in our constitutional law of policing. I want to throw a spotlight on
how the Court defines what the state can do in terms of what the state in fact does.
Official practice as a basis for Fourth Amendment protection has played a pivotal
role in recent cases concerning the interaction of new technologies and the law of search and
seizure. Although I will substantiate that point by a careful analysis of the overall doctrine, it
is useful to introduce the idea of Fourth Amendment gloss with two recent examples, both
of which concerning the impact of technology on constitutional protection from state
searches and seizures. Although Fourth Amendment gloss did not prevail in both cases, they
still crisply illustrate the kind roles it can play.
First, in the 2018 case of Carpenter v. United States, the Court faced the question
whether government acquisition of cell-site locational data from a suspect’s
Thus, Ronald Dworkin’s canonical formulation of rights as “trumps.” RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS
SERIOUSLY 184-205 (1977); see also ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, UTOPIA 29 (1974) (describing rights as
“side constraints”).
2 The U.S. Constitution largely adumbrates negative rights. But cf. David P. Currie, Positive and Negative
Constitutional Rights, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 864, 886 (1986) (“From the beginning there have been cases in which
the Supreme Court, sometimes very persuasively, has found in negatively phrased provisions constitutional
duties that can in some sense be described as positive.”).
3 Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in A Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293,
1315 (1984) (“Having a constitutional right to perform a given act means, at least, that one may perform that
act without governmental interference.”).
4 A right defined in its of government practice at a specific point in time, such as the Founding, would in
contrast constrain innovations with libertarian externalities.
5 See Aziz Z. Huq, Separation of Powers Metatheory, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 1517, 1523 (2018) (discussing the role of
“historical gloss” in separation of powers jurisprudence); see also infra Part I.A. (exploring the scholarly literature
on separation-of-powers gloss).
1

-3Electroniccopy
copyavailable
available at:
at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3224455
Electronic
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3224455

telecommunications provider counted as a “search” under the Fourth Amendment.6 For a
majority of the Court, the case concerned “a new phenomenon: the ability to chronicle a
person's past movements through the record of his cell phone signals.” 7 Chief Justice
Roberts’s opinion hinged on a distinction between cell-site locational data and other kinds of
information historically obtained by the government without a warrant. He stressed that
“novel circumstances” required a fresh consideration of the principle that records held by
third parties fell outside the Fourth Amendment’s scope.8 History thus had no bite.
In contrast, the main dissent by Justice Kennedy viewed the essential continuity of
warrantless acquisition of cell-site data and previous investigative practices as a legitimating
basis for the government’s action. Cell-site acquisition, Justice Kennedy stressed in his
opening paragraphs, was both “reasonable” and “accepted.”9 He then placed emphasis on
“the longstanding rule that the Government may use compulsory process to compel persons
to disclose documents and other evidence within their possession and control.”10 Such use of
compulsory disclosure was “well established,” explained Justice Kennedy, “even when the
records contain private information.”11 Indeed, this practice was so entrenched that it had
created a “reliance” interest on the part of police, “state and federal grand juries, state and
federal administrative agencies, and state and federal legislative bodies.”12 Hence, the sheer
fact of continuance usage legitimated a state practice under the Fourth Amendment for
Justice Kennedy, notwithstanding intervening technological change.
A central difference between the Carpenter majority and its dissent was the extent to
which the Justices were willing to perceive warrantless acquisition of cell-site data as a
(necessarily legitimate) extension of an older practice, as distinct from a novelty requiring
fresh thinking. Carpenter is unusual only insofar as the argument from historical practice
failed.
A similar choice between the embrace of historical continuity and a recognition of a
technological rupture informs the various opinions in United States v. Jones, a second case
concerning new technologies. 13 Jones unanimously held that police could not engage in
warrantless placement and tracking of a global positioning system (“GPS”) device on a
vehicle.14 Whereas Justice Scalia’s majority opinion framed the case as the application of a
longstanding trespass rule, the concurring opinions of Justices Sotomayor and Alito stressed
the issue’s novelty—and, critically, the absence of any tradition of analogous police

558 U.S. --, 2018 WL 3073916, at*6- *7 (June 22, 2018) (considering whether acquisition of cell-site locational
data from a third-party data provider constitutes a “search”).
7 Id. at *9.
8 Id.
9 Id. at *16 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
10 Id. at *21 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
11 Id.
12 Id. at *22 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (quotations omitted).
13 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 405-11 (2012).
14 Id. at 405.
6
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practice.15 Stated otherwise, for the concurring Justices in Jones and Carpenter the absence of
an analogous historical gloss was fatal to the government’s case for the validity of GPS
tracking.
Jones and Carpenter are not methodological outliers: Gloss plays a central role across a
large swathe of Fourth Amendment law. First, it has played a central role in titrating the
authority that police have to make arrests without a warrant. Second, it has configured the
path of Fourth Amendment law in respect to vehicular stops. And third, it has been invoked
both to justify and also to constrain the supply of remedies for constitutional violations in
the context of criminal trials.16 In these cases, its relevant has often impinged more acutely
than in Jones and Carpenter.
The Article’s second contribution is evaluative: Is Fourth Amendment gloss, I ask, a
good idea? To analyze that question, I draw on larger methodological debates in structural
constitutional law, where the idea of ‘gloss’ has received far more sustained attention.
Borrowing from the growing scholarship on historical gloss in the separation-of-powers
context, I posit three theoretical grounds forgiving weight to official practice as a source of
constitutional meaning. First, gloss might be evidence of acquiescence to a practice by official
actors who have freestanding authority to interpret the Constitution. Giving weight to their
views is an appropriate implication of the Constitution’s distribution of interpretive authority
across distinct institutions. Second, gloss may be the distillate of experience over years and
generations. As such, it may represent a kind of Burkean wisdom not to be lightly dismissed.
Third, gloss may be valuable simply because it represents a focal equilibrium for officials and
citizens. As such, it serves as a settlement to enable coordination around the defense of
constitutional norms.
These three theoretical foundations for the use of official practice as a source of
constitutional meaning, however, largely fail to provide a satisfying foundation for Fourth
Amendment gloss. The argument from acquiescence works in the separation of powers
context because coordinate branches of the federal government can provide legitimating
acquiescence to each other’s practices. But in the Fourth Amendment context, it is not easy
to identify a class of official actors charged with making careful determinations of
constitutionality in response to new forms of search and seizure. The dialogic process of
acquiescence, therefore, simply does not happen in the necessary way. The argument from
Burkean wisdom, in contrast, proves to be incompatible with the political economy,
information economy, and history of the actors regulated by the Fourth Amendment.
Finally, the possibility that gloss might serve as coordinating settlement fails to fit observed
usages of official practice presently found in the law reports. And yet just because all three
Compare id. at 405 (“[O]ur Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was tied to common-law trespass, at least until
the latter half of the 20th century.”), with id. at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[T]he same
technological advances that have made possible nontrespassory surveillance techniques … also affect the
[Fourth Amendment threshold] test by shaping the evolution of societal privacy expectations.”), and id. at 42425 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) (accusing the Court of “disregard[ing] what is really important” in the
use of a GPS device by focusing on the trespass).
16 These points of doctrine are developed infra in Part II.
15
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plausible justifications for Fourth Amendment gloss fail, though, that does not mean judges
will cease to engage in the practice. Indeed, I point to powerful institutional and ideological
compulsions supporting the practice, quite independent of its merits. Given the likelihood
that courts will continue to rely on gloss, even when doing so is unjustified, I conclude by
sketching how the practice’s error costs might at least be cabined.
Despite its pervasive use, Fourth Amendment gloss remains peripheral to scholarly
debates. Perhaps this relative marginality arises because gloss matters most to the mechanics
of Fourth Amendment law only after the Court has determined what counts as a “search.”17
The latter topic tends to receive the lion’s share of scholarly attention. Less well studied are
the far more unglamorous procedural questions of what steps the Government must take a
search lawful, and what remedies follow when these steps are not taken. Whatever the
reason for the lacuna, there is at present no sustained or careful consideration of how official
practice does, or should, configure the reach and operation of Fourth Amendment
protections. A major element of the doctrine, therefore, hence operates largely in the
scholarly dark.
While legal scholars have not addressed Fourth Amendment gloss systematically, my
analysis here draws inspiration from, and extends, earlier scholarship on searches ad seizures.
One path-marking precursor is David Sklansky’s work on the role of common law concepts
from the time of Fourth Amendment’s ratification in the Fourth Amendment law of the
1990s.18 As I detail below,19 gloss is distinct from the common law materials with which
Sklansky reckoned. But his general approach of situating the Fourth Amendment in the
larger body of constitutional doctrine is admirable and merits attention. Another precursor
to my analysis is Anna Lvovsky’s recent historicizing intervention, which focuses on the
midcentury origins of judicial deference to police expertise.20 She approaches some of the
same issues as my analysis here—in particular the epistemic arguments for gloss—but does
so from a very different perspective and with a different scope of historical coverage.
Sklansky’s and Lvovsky’s work provide intellectual coordinates from which the present
inquiry presses forward.

A sampling of the most prominent scholarship includes Richard M. Re, Fourth Amendment Fairness, 116 MICH.
L. REV. 1409 (2018); William Baude & James Y. Stern, The Positive Law Model of the Fourth Amendment, 129 HARV.
L. REV. 1821, 1877 (2016); Matthew B. Kugler & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Actual Expectations of Privacy, Fourth
Amendment Doctrine, and the Mosaic Theory, 2015 SUP. CT. REV. 205 (2015); Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth
Amendment Protection, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 503 (2007); Sherry F. Colb, What Is a Search? Two Conceptual Flaws in Fourth
Amendment Doctrine and Some Hints of a Remedy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 119, 122 (2002).
18 David A. Sklansky, The Fourth Amendment and Common Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1739, 1743 (2000) (noting
that the Court “has made the principal criterion for identifying violations of the Fourth Amendment ‘whether a
particular governmental action . . . was regarded as an unlawful search or seizure under the common law when
the Amendment was framed’” (citation omitted)).
19 See infra text accompanying notes 78 to 83.
20 Anna Lvovsky, The Judicial Presumption of Police Expertise, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1995, 1998–99 (2017) (“Starting
in the 1950s, judges came to rely on the promise of police expertise--the notion that trained, experienced
officers develop rarefied and reliable insight into crime--to expand police authority in multiple areas of the
law.”).
17
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My analysis proceeds in four steps. In the first Part, I set out the uses of gloss in
other domains of constitutional law. In particular, I tease out three distinct rationales for
turning to observed practice as a source of constitutional meaning. These rationales are
intended to serve as a framework for evaluating Fourth Amendment gloss. The second Part
makes a detailed descriptive case for the pivotal role that gloss has played across the Fourth
Amendment jurisprudential waterfront. I aim to show that gloss shapes many commonly
employed rules of Fourth Amendment law, in particular concerning warrantless arrests,
searches of individuals, and vehicular stops; it also shapes the Court’s remedial choices. Part
Three considers whether the available theoretical rationales for gloss—identified in other
domains of constitutional law—support its use in the Fourth Amendment context. The
result here is largely negative: Few normatively persuasive grounds exist for using gloss in
the Fourth Amendment context. Finally, I turn in Part Four to the question of what follows
from this negative assessment. Gloss, I suggest will continue to be employed for ideological
and institutional reasons. But there are ways to mitigate its downside costs.
I.

Using Gloss in Constitutional Interpretation

This Part develops the scope and function of “gloss” in constitutional jurisprudence.
This entails first offering a definition of gloss as it has emerged in other domains of
constitutional law. I develop this definition though an explication of the reasons the Court
and sympathetic scholars have tendered for reliance on historical practice.
A.

Gloss as a Source of Constitutional Meaning

The idea of a post-ratification institutional practice as an illuminating “gloss” on
open-textured constitutional provisions is most closely associated with Justice Frankfurter’s
concurrence in the so-called Steel Seizure case.21 In his concurrence, Frankfurter defined
gloss as “a systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the
Congress and never before questioned, engaged in by Presidents who have also sworn to
uphold the Constitution.”22 This definition is not without its ambiguities.23 Still, Frankfurter’s
idea of “gloss” can be usefully decomposed into three constituent parts solely using his own
verbal formulation: (1) a historical practice by an official actor; (2) that is temporally durable
rather than momentary and fleeting; and (3) that has been recognized and endorsed by other
official institutions, such as Congress. I assume for the balance of this Article that this
definition captures the meaning of “gloss.” I shall also use the terms “gloss” and “practice”
interchangeably to capture this tripartite idea.
The concept of historical gloss has been repeated pressed into service in the Court’s
separation of powers jurisprudence. It is “an important interpretive factor even when the
nature or longevity of that practice is subject to dispute, and even when that practice began
For an account of the provenance of the term, see Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss
and the Separation of Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV. 411, 413-14 (2012).
22 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 611 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
23 See infra text accompanying notes 36 to 40 (documenting ambiguities).
21
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after the founding era.”24 For instance, gloss plays a role in the Court’s judgments on recess
appointments,25 interbranch condominiums (such as the U.S. Sentencing Commission),26 the
pocket veto, 27 the unwritten executive power to preempt state laws on foreign affairs
grounds, 28 and the executive’s power to “recognize” other nations. 29 In all these
jurisprudential domains, post-ratification practice of executive branch actors—if open,
notorious, and wanting for objections—does double-duty as evidence of how a
constitutional ambiguity should be resolved.
In all these instances, gloss operated as positive evidence of constitutionality. At
other times, courts take the absence of historical practice as proof of constitutional
authority’s absence. Examples of gloss’s negative use can be found in the Court’s Article III
and anti-commandeering jurisprudences. For example, when considering a federal statute
that purported to re-open a federal court’s final judgment the Court has observed that there
was “no [other] instance in which Congress has attempted to set aside the final judgment of
an Article III court by retroactive legislation,” a “prolonged reticence” that “would be
amazing if such interference were not understood to be constitutionally proscribed.” 30
Similarly, in fashioning an anti-commandeering prohibition to protect states’ sovereign
prerogatives from federal takeover, the Court has repeatedly underscored the idea that an
absence of historical practice lent credence to a constitutional challenge.31 Most recently, in a
challenge to the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act, Justice Alito echoed his
Jones opinion and reaffirmed the salience of gloss’s absence by drawing attention to the
“unprecedented” and “isolated” nature of federal commandeering efforts.32
The positive and negative uses of gloss are not wholly identical, although they are
closely related enough to warrant being considered in tandem. The inference taken from an
absence of practice tends to be more narrowly gauged than the inference drawn from
NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2560 (2014).
Id.
26 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 400-01 (1989) (using gloss to conclude that the Constitution did not
bar “judicial participation in certain extrajudicial activity”).
27 The Pocket Veto Cases, 279 U.S. 655, 689 (1929) (“Long settled and established practice is a consideration of
great weight in a proper interpretation of constitutional provisions of this character.”).
28 American Insurance Association v Garamendi, 539 US 396, 414 (2003) (“[T]he historical gloss on the
‘executive Power’ vested in Article II of the Constitution has recognized the President's ‘vast share of
responsibility for the conduct of our foreign relations.”’ (quotation omitted)).
29 Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2086 (2015) (“[T]he President since the founding has
exercised this unilateral power to recognize new states—and the Court has endorsed the practice.”). For a
skeptical view of gloss’s role in Zivotofsky, see Curtis A. Bradley, Historical Gloss, the Recognition Power, and Judicial
Review, 109 AM. J. INT’L L. UNBOUND 2, 2 (2016) (“[W]hereas in some cases historical practice shapes
perceptions about other interpretive materials, in Zivotofsky II the principal direction of influence was the other
way around.”).
30 Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 230 (1995).
31 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 175-76 (1992); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 905
(1997). Similar arguments are to be found in Commerce Clause jurisprudence. See, e.g., Nat'l Fed'n of Indep.
Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2586 (2012) (“[T]he lack of historical precedent” is a “telling indication of [a]
severe constitutional problem.”).
32 Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1476 (2018)
24
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practice. The absence of practice is generally taken solely as circumstantial evidence that
many generations of political leaders believed a power to be beyond Congress’s reach. As a
species of circumstantial evidence, it is considered in light of other potential reasons for
congressional inaction.33 Further, the Court has never even hinted that desuetude might
directly cause the absence of authority. It has never, that is, made a symmetrical claim to the
Frankfurter argument in the Steel Seizure case that the mere persistence of desuetude can
directly create a new species of institutional power that did not previously exist. It has never
suggested, that is, that the failure to act creates power in the way that action can do.
Bracketing the Fourth Amendment, gloss has spilled over only intermittently beyond
separation of powers and federalism jurisprudence. In the 2016 case of Evenwel v. Abbott, for
instance, the Court adjudicated a challenge to states’ reliance on total population, as opposed
to the population of eligible voters, for legislative districting. The Court upheld Texas’s
practice of using total population by looking to the “settled practice” of “all 50 States and
countless local jurisdictions … for decades, even centuries.”34 In First Amendment cases too,
the Court has also weighed “widespread and time-tested” state practice in evaluating the
constitutionality of an election regulation. 35 Despite being rather theoretically
underwhelming—the Court, that is, saying nothing about why historical practice is relevant—
these isolate examples imply that an official practice can be constitutionally significant even
when it involves the independent, uncoordinated actions of plural sovereigns (i.e., different
states) at distinct moments in historical time. In Evenwel, for example, the salient use of a
voter population metric for redistricting extended across every state in the nation, and
downward to many substate jurisdictions. The Court, moreover, did not ask for evidence
that all these jurisdictions were acting in concert, or speaking from a shared hymnal. The
independent, uncoordinated quality of a state practice, that is posed no per se bar to judicial
reliance on gloss.
Notwithstanding its diffusion across diverse domains of constitutional law, the idea
of “gloss” nonetheless remains imprecise along several margins. First, it is not clear how the
relevant institutional practice is defined.36 A state practice can often be defined at different
levels of generality. The more general and abstract the description, the wider the shadow cast
by historical practice on contemporary constitutional meaning. Second, although it is clear
that gloss need not be anchored in the early Republic, it is not clear how long a practice must
endure before it ripens into significance for constitutional interpretation. How many
instances of a discrete action, for instance, must be observed before the term “gloss” or
“practice” is warranted? The case law yields no answer. Third, in the separation-of-powers
context, there is a question of what exactly constitutes acquiescence by the coordinate
Of course, the absence of legislative action can be explained by many factors in a governmental system
characterized by veto-gates and novel policy crises. Leah M. Litman, Debunking Antinovelty, 66 DUKE L.J. 1407,
1429-48 (2017) (cataloguing alternative causes of novelty).
34 Evenwel v. Abbott, 136 S. Ct. 1120, 1132 (2016).
35 Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 203–206 (1992) (plurality opinion); see also Walz v. Tax Comm'n of City of
New York, 397 U.S. 664, 678 (1970) (“unbroken practice” followed “openly and by affirmative state action, not
covertly or by state inaction, is not something to be lightly cast aside”).
36 Alison L. LaCroix, Historical Gloss: A Primer, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 75, 77 (2013).
33
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branch sufficient to induce a practice’s ratification. The definition of acquiescence might be
thought be vary across different branches of government. Congress, for example, might face
transaction costs in overcoming its collective action problems that do not hinder the
executive branch. 37 Acquiescence by the latter might therefore be calibrated in less
demanding terms in light of the lower risk that inaction or ambiguous action will be
mistaken for endorsement.
Finally, assuming the relevant practice and the responsive acquiescence have been
defined with sufficient clarity, the question remains what weight a federal court will assign to
gloss in the process of resolving a constitutional question. A court might treat evidence of
historical gloss merely as evidence of historical actors’ understanding of the Constitution, as
in the commandeering cases. In other instances, gloss supplies a complete and dispositive
answer to a question left open by constitutional text.38 Rather more subtly, in yet other cases
“historical practice can affect perceptions about the clarity or ambiguity of the text.”39 How
to characterize gloss’s relationship to other sources of constitutional meaning, moreover,
remains open. Probably the most that can be said now is that courts implicitly weight various
sources of constitutional meaning, but do so implicitly and imprecisely. And it is not clear
this is a bad thing. Perhaps it is possible to create a more precise algorithm for deciding how
to weigh text, original meaning, precedent, purpose, and gloss. But it is far from clear that
routinizing constitutional interpretation in this fashion would have a desirable effect on the
ineffable and very human art of judging.40
B.

Justifications for the Use of Gloss as a Source of Constitutional Meaning

Jurists and scholars alike have become so inured to invocations of gloss in
constitutional argument that they have ceased to notice how peculiar it is. Reliance on
official practice to resolve a constitutional dispute might first be taken to imply that there is
no evidence contemporaneous to the Constitution’s enactment that resolves the disputes.
Indeed, Justice Frankfurter sliced cleanly between “the words of the Constitution” and “the
Bradley & Morrison, supra note 21, at 448 (“[I]t is precarious to infer congressional acquiescence” from “the
absence of legislation prohibiting the executive action in question ….”). In contrast, a recent study of
nonexecutive foreign relations matters has also underscored the gap between Congress’s and the executive’s
capacity to respond to another branches practice-based assertions of constitutional authority. Kristen E.
Eichensehr, Courts, Congress, and the Conduct of Foreign Relations, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 609, 615 (2018) (positing that
“[t]he comparative ease with which the president can respond to actions by the nonexecutive branches suggests
that silence by the executive is a more meaningful signal of approval or acquiescence than silence by
Congress”).
38 For an instance in which gloss has played a seemingly conclusive role, see Dames & Moore v Regan, 453 U.S.
654, 686 (1981).
39 Curtis A. Bradley and Neil S. Siegel, After Recess: Historical Practice, Textual Ambiguity, and Constitutional Adverse
Possession, 2014 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 41–42 (2014); accord Curtis A. Bradley, Treaty Termination and Historical Gloss, 92
TEX. L. REV. 773, 815-16 (2014) (noting that the Court never expressly says it is setting aside constitutional
text, even if gloss allows it to find ambiguity).
40 For a landmark effort to show that “constitutional interpretation is, after all, less free-form an exercise” than
some suppose, see Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in
Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221, 1227 (1995).
37
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gloss which life has written upon them” as two distinct sources of law.41 Historical gloss,
moreover, looks at the actions of elected and appointed actors, often pursuing local and
idiosyncratic policy agendas, as a source of new meaning of the Constitution that empowers
those subsequent iterations of those officials. Gloss thus can have an inherent circularity, at least
when federal power is at stake.42 And when a court relies on gloss to issue a final judgment, it
transmutes political actors’ inchoate, perhaps contested, perhaps even inarticulate situation
sense into a hard, definite rule of constitutional law. 43 This has consequences. Very
concretely, violations of a judicially ratified gloss can precipitate damages and injunctive
relief; gloss in the absence of judicial endorsement cannot.44
Judicial reliance on officials’ practice, therefore, is in need of justification. Yet the
Justices have not tried to explain for why historical gloss can patch gaps in constitutional
meaning (although they have offered a reason for using inaction as circumstantial evidence
of shared constitutional understanding when evaluating the absence of a historical record.45)
Into this gap, scholars have leapt.46 I thus draw on both case law and secondary sources in
developing a set of justifications for courts’ use of gloss. Specifically, I perceive three
potential justifications for that practice in the literature—gloss as acquiescence, gloss as
Burkean wisdom, and gloss as settlement.
First, “courts and other interpreters privilege acquiescence to historical practice”
precisely because it reflects an “agreement” among constitutionally relevant actors.47 One
example of bare acquiescence is Dames and Moore v. Regan, where the majority emphasized
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
To the extent that Fourth Amendment gloss is a product of local and state police action, it is not amenable
to this circularity critique. Yet to date gloss in the criminal procedure domain has tended to prioritize the
judgments of federal over state actors. See infra text accompanying notes 123 to 124.
43 One way to think about gloss in the absence of judicial ratification is as a form of constitutional
“convention.” Keith Whittington, The Status of Unwritten Constitutional Norms in the United States, 2013 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1847, 1853 (introducing this idea into U.S. constitutional discourse). Hence, Bradley and Siegel suggest
that there is an analytic distinction between “practice-based norms that have legal status (in which case they
would constitute historical gloss) and those that do not (in which case they would constitute constitutional
conventions), regardless of whether they are subject to judicial review.” Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel,
Historical Gloss, Constitutional Conventions, and the Judicial Separation of Powers, 105 GEO. L.J. 255, 267 (2017). I am
not convinced, however, that in judicial consideration of gloss that courts draw a crisp and clear distinction
between patterns of official behavior based on the presence or absence of “legal status” (however that is
defined). Bradley and Siegel may thus offer a degree of analytic precision above and beyond what the observed
practice of the judiciary would support. Where the relevant practice is shared among a highly decentralized and
dispersed set of actors—as in the Fourth Amendment context—it becomes even harder to distinguish between
the presence and the absence of “legal status.” As a result, the distinction that Bradley and Siegel draw becomes
even harder to sustain.
44 For a similar intuition, see Michael C. Dorf, How the Written Constitution Crowds Out the Extraconstitutional Rule of
Recognition, in THE RULE OF RECOGNITION AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 69, 75 (Matthew D. Adler &
Kenneth Einar Himma eds. 2009) (noting that “for some customary rules, there is no readily available hook,
and as a consequence, political actors may be tempted to violate them” when they would not have violated a
constitutional rule).
45 See infra text accompanying note --.
46 The leading piece is Bradley & Morrison, supra note 21, at passim.
47 Id. at 433.
41
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that “Congress has accepted the authority of the Executive to enter into settlement
agreements.”48 The Court did so without alluding to any functional justifications Congress
might have had for its agreement. The mere fact of policy dialogue, leading to convergence,
was enough.
Acquiescence from nonjudicial actors on constitutionality of an action is relevant if
one believes that the Court does not have a monopoly on the power to interpret the
Constitution. In the separation-of-powers context, such a “departmentalist” view is common
among commentators; it also forms a cornerstone of the political question doctrine.49 An
acquiescence-based view of gloss, as its name suggests, is not predicated simply on the
decision of the branch engaged in the relevant conduct. It also reflects the response such
behavior elicits from other officials. That response is treated “as a kind of waiver of the
affected branch’s institutional prerogatives.”50 In the separation-of-powers context, gloss as
acquiescence therefore trades upon the “negotiated” character of certain constitutional
rules,51 a view that takes the original Constitution less as a manifesto of negative restraint and
more as a menu of positive governance options to be employed in response to contingencies
both known and unexpected.
Second, a court might take the view that it owes no deference to other governmental
actors’ constitutional judgments, but might nonetheless take the view that the practical wisdom
embodied in a series of policy decisions warrants respect. On this “functional” approach,
historical gloss comprises a body of “accumulated wisdom” to which courts owe deference.52
This justification sounds in a “Burkean” register inasmuch as it looks to what the English
politician and political thinker Edmund Burke called “the collected reason of the ages” as
more likely to be correct than first-order reasoning by contemporary actors seeking to
innovate against the grain of received wisdom.53
Notice that gloss as Burkean wisdom rests on a sort of intellectual parlor trick that,
in other contexts, has discomforted the Justices. A policy judgment on the part of
nonjudicial actors is metamorphosed into a rule of constitutional law that cannot be
derogated by statute or qualified by official discretion. Practical wisdom, that is, is
transmuted into law. In a different context, several members of the Court have expressed
discomfort about decades-old doctrines of judicial deference to administrative agencies’
expert judgments on the meaning of ambiguous statutes.54 One Justice has gone so far as to
Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 681 (1981).
Id. at 434 & n.89 (collecting leading departmentalist texts).
50 Id. at 435.
51 For a defense of this idea of “negotiated” constitutional positions, see Aziz Z. Huq, The Negotiated Structural
Constitution, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1595 (2014).
52 Bradley & Morrison, supra note 21, at 435.
53 Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, in THE PORTABLE EDMUND BURKE 416, 456-57 (Isaac
Kramnick ed., 1999). Although the Court has not described gloss in Burkean terms, in the leading scholarly
piece on “Burkean” jurisprudence, Cass Sunstein characterizes the Steel Seizure decision as a leading example
of the genre. Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 105 MICH. L. REV. 353, 356 n.11 (2006).
54 See, e.g., Pereira v. Sessions, 585 U.S. --, 2018 WL 3058276, at *14 (June 21, 2018) (Kennedy, J., concurring);
Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass'n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1210 (2015) (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
48
49
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suggest that such deference violates the Constitution’s separation of powers.55 The core
concern propelling these critiques, as articulated by then-Judge Gorsuch, speaks in terms of
“concentrate[d] federal power” and “the abdication of the judicial duty.”56 Just this last
Term, Justice Kennedy directed concern at a government actor’s power to define the scope
of her own discretionary authority.57
There is a rough analogy between judicial deference to other officials’ expertisebacked judgments about the Constitution (at issue in gloss), and their expertise-backed
judgments about the meaning of federal statutes (at issue in the deference debate). The
Justices have not noticed this analogy. But there is also a gap in the judicial treatment of
these similar species of expertise-backed judgment. I flag this gap here because it opens up a
productive line of inquiry in respect to Fourth Amendment gloss: Should nonjudicial actors’
expertise-backed views of what the prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures
requires receive the same deference as judgments on the separation of power, or is it more
akin to judgments about statutes? And should the concerns about concentrated power bear
upon the scope of Fourth Amendment gloss? Analogies across doctrinal boundaries make
either a positive or a negative answer possible.
A third way that historical gloss can be justified is terms of settlement rather than
wisdom. Where a practice has emerged as a stable equilibrium solution to constitutional
ambiguity, the mere fact of its stability may be sufficient to attract normative freight. Even if
it is possible to imagine a better equilibrium, historical practice may warrant courts’ respect
simply because it comports with all relevant actors’ settled expectations. In consequence, any
move to a new equilibrium would necessarily be costly. When official actors settle “upon an
institutional arrangement that they both deem desirable or at least practically workable and
acceptable,” that is, the bare fact of functionality suffices to trigger judicial respect.58
Justice Frankfurter supplied an example of gloss as settlement in his Youngstown
concurrence. There, he discussed United States v. Midwest Oil, 59 a dispute concerning
presidential withdrawals of public land from the real-estate market.60 The Midwest Oil Court,
explained Frankfurter, had authorized a practice that extended “over a period of 80 years

judgment); id. at 1211 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597,
615-16 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (Justice Alito joined Chief Justice Roberts's opinion); id. at 616 (Scalia,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
55 Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2713 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“These cases bring into bold relief
the scope of the potentially unconstitutional delegations we have come to countenance in the name of Chevron
deference.”).
56 Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1149, 1152, 1155 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
57 Pereira, 585 U.S. --, 2018 WL 3058276, at *14 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (finding especially “troubling” the
“reflexive deference exhibited [to] an agency's interpretation of the statutory provisions that concern the scope
of its own authority”).
58 Bradley & Morrison, supra note 21, at 434.
59 United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459 (1915).
60 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 611 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (discussing
Midwest Oil).

- 13 Electroniccopy
copyavailable
available at:
at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3224455
Electronic
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3224455

and in 252 instances, and by Presidents learned and unlearned in the law.”61 Frankfurter here is
plainly not leaning on the considered legal judgment of past chief executives. Rather, the
legal force of gloss in Midwest Oil derived from the sheer persistence in time and frequency
of the practice. More recently, a majority of the Court in NLRB v. Noel Canning endorsed the
president’s use of the Recess Appointment power to fill vacancies arising before a Senate
recess out of a concern that “upset[ting] this traditional practice … would seriously shrink
the authority that Presidents have believed existed and have exercised for so long.”62
The idea of gloss as settlement can be normatively fortified by drawing upon the
positive political theory literature on constitutions as focal points. Economists have
observed that in situations with multiple potential equilibrium solutions, “players [can] still
‘know’ what to do” based on “knowledge … from both directly relevant past experience and
a sense of how individuals act generally.”63 That is, they have an exogenously supplied ‘focal
point.’ The theory of focal points is relevant here because one important function of written
constitutions is to provide a “crisp focal point” for citizens concerned about government
overreaching or illegality.64 Like a proverbial red line, the focal point supplies “diffuse social
and political actors with a coordinating signal that [constitutional] norms are imperiled.”65 A
focal point account helps explain why it makes sense for courts to transform inchoate and
atextual understandings shared by political actors into hard-edged, textually precise legal
rules. Such a transformation leverages the “expressive power a third party wields when he
declares to disputants how they should resolve their dispute.”66 The court, acting as that
third party, reduces uncertainty and elicits legal compliance and predictably by reducing what
had previously been an understanding ‘in the air’ to one that can easily be consulted and
verified—i.e., a focal point.
Gloss as settlement is subtly different from gloss as acquiescence or gloss as Burkean
wisdom. It is less dependent on the fact of officials’ agreement, and so less sensitive to the
possibility of protest, explicit or implicit, against an official position on the scope of legal
powers. Further, whereas the argument from Burkean wisdom would seem to demand some
durable pattern of behavior in order to draw an inference of wisdom accrued, the argument
for settlement might be predicated on a briefer span of conduct. Something can serve as a
focal point, that is, even if it has not been implemented iteratively over a long time. Gloss as
settlement, therefore, may be the least profound and the most instrumental of all three
theoretical grounds for gloss.

Id. (emphasis added).
N.L.R.B. v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2573 (2014).
63 DAVID M. KREPS, GAME THEORY AND ECONOMIC MODELING 101 (1990). The seminal discussion of focal
points is THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 54-58 (1960).
64 Aziz Huq & Tom Ginsburg, How to Lose A Constitutional Democracy, 65 UCLA L. REV. 78, 119 (2018); see also
Barry R. Weingast, The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law, 91 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 245 (1997)
(developing a formal model of focal points).
65 Huq & Ginsburg, supra note 64, at 110.
66 Richard H. McAdams, The Expressive Power of Adjudication, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 1043, 1048 (2005).
61
62
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II.

The Varieties of Fourth Amendment Gloss

Let us turn from the justifications for gloss to the ways in which gloss is employed in
the Fourth Amendment context. There are three categories of usage: gloss as substantive content;
gloss as benchmark; and gloss as substitute. These three categories describe how gloss is used in
search and seizure law. (A caution—they do not map neatly onto the three justifications for
gloss described in Part I. Uses and justifications are different matters).
A complicating factor is that Fourth Amendment gloss arises at distinctive vertices
of an elaborate jurisprudential terrain. To understand the role of gloss, it is useful to begin by
mapping the terrain in which the use of gloss arises, and identifying what kind of Fourth
Amendment questions it illuminates. Fourth Amendment analysis has three steps.67 First, a
court must determine whether a particular state action is a ‘search’ or ‘seizure.’68 Second,
assuming that the state action is a search or seizure such that the Fourth Amendment is even
triggered, then there is a question of what follows procedurally from that determination. The
Fourth Amendment, using grammatically disjunctive terms, talks of “warrants” and then
disavows “unreasonable” searches and seizures.69 In practice, courts can impose one of a
range of different procedural rules on a covered action, ranging from a requirement of a
warrant based on probable cause to permission to engage in searches without any warrant
requirement (or any other form of ex ante superintendence) or any evidentiary predicate.
This range is illustrated in microcosm by the Court’s treatment of searches incident to arrest.
For most objects, arrest triggers authority to search without any warrant or quantum of
suspicion. 70 But for cellphones, it displaces neither the warrant nor the probable cause
requirement.71 Finally, after a court has found that an official has violated the procedural
terms of the Fourth Amendment, it must still determine whether a remedy in the form of
damages or exclusion is warranted. In both damages actions and suppression motions,
however, the Court has fashioned screening rules that preclude remediation absent a
showing of “fault” on the part of the state official.72 In the damages context, this is a
function of qualified immunity.73 In the suppression context, it follows from the good faith
exception to suppression.74
Orin S. Kerr, An Economic Understanding of Search and Seizure Law, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 610 (2016) (“The
Fourth Amendment prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures can be divided into three questions.”)
68 See, e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 558 U.S. --, 2018 WL 3073916, at*6- *7 (June 22, 2018) (considering
whether acquisition of cell-site locational data from a third-party data provider constitutes a “search”).
69 Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 759 (1994) (noting that
“Amendment's words and take them seriously: they do not require warrants, probable cause, or exclusion of
evidence, but they do require that all searches and seizures be reasonable”)
70 United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224 (1973) (“[A] search incident to a lawful arrest is a traditional
exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment.”)
71 Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2495 (2014) (“Our answer to the question of what police must do before
searching a cell phone seized incident to an arrest is accordingly simple—get a warrant.”).
72 Aziz Z. Huq & Genevieve Lakier, Apparent Fault, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1525, 1547 (2018); see also Orin Kerr,
Fourth Amendment Remedies and Development of the Law: A Comment on Camreta v. Greene and Davis v. United
States, 2011 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 237, 237-39 (discussing convergence in these two lines of Fourth Amendment
remedies),
73 Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555 (1967).
74 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 924-25 (1984).
67
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Where in this complex structure does the Court inject official practice as a source of
law? Gloss is generally not invoked to ascertain what counts as a search or seizure. The most
common invocation of gloss instead occurs at the second stage, when a court considers what
kind of process officials must follow. The Court has repeatedly framed this inquiry in terms
of “reasonableness.”75 At one point, the Justices equated reasonableness with a presumptive
warrant requirement.76 Subsequently, the Court “reasonableness” would be glossed in terms
of the common law circa 1791.77 But this ‘originalist’ analysis—which I shall explore in more
detail momentarily—proved insufficient,78 leaving room for an inquiry into gloss.79 The final
use of ‘gloss as substitute’ occurs in the third, remedial step of the Fourth Amendment
inquiry, where it supplies a reason not to award remedies.
It is worth pausing here to clarify the distinction between Fourth Amendment gloss
and the Court’s use of eighteenth-century common law. These arguments are distinct,
although both partially look at official behavior. In the 1990s, the Supreme Court began
invoking with increasingly frequency the notion that “the common law when the
Amendment was framed” was a reference point for reasonableness.80 For instance, the Court
has looked to common-law trespass law to determine whether the placement of a GPS
device on the chassis of a vehicle was a “search.”81 Building on this precedent, Justice
Thomas recently invoked the “common law” as a basis for condemning the exclusionary
rule.82 These arguments are methodologically distinct from gloss arguments. Rather than
looking to what state officials do, they focus on the content of the law. No question of
acquiescence or the duration of behavior arises. Moreover, rather than ranging across time,

See, e.g., County of Los Angeles v. Mendez, 137 S. Ct. 1539, 1546 (2017) (“[R]easonableness is always the
touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis ….” (quoting Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2186 (2016);
Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 398 (2006) (“The Fourth Amendment's ultimate touchstone is
‘reasonableness’….”).
76 Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 547, 559 (1999) (“For most of
[the twentieth] century, the Supreme Court has endorsed what is now called the ‘warrant-preference’
construction of Fourth Amendment reasonableness, in which the use of a valid warrant ... is the salient factor
in assessing the reasonableness of a search or seizure.”).
77 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 406 (2012) (“At bottom, we must ‘assur[e] preservation of that degree
of privacy against government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted.”’ (citation omitted)); see
also Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 299-300 (1999) (“In determining whether a particular governmental
action violates [the Fourth Amendment], we inquire first whether the action was regarded as an unlawful search
or seizure under the common law when the Amendment was framed.”).
78 See Sklansky, supra note 18, at 1762-70 (developing powerful criticisms of the originalist approach).
79 On the wide and varied use of the term “reasonableness” across heterogeneous fields of law, see Benjamin C.
Zipursky, Reasonableness in and Out of Negligence Law, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 2131, 2135 (2015) (The range of uses of
“reasonableness” in law is so great that a list is not an efficient way to describe and demarcate it.”).
80 Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 299 (1999); accord Florida v. White, 526 U.S. 559, 563 (1999); Wilson v.
Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 931 (1995).
81 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404 (2012).
82 Collins v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 1663, 1677 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting that “the common law
sometimes reflected the inverse of the exclusionary rule” as a ground for abandoning the latter).
75
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these common-law cases train resolutely on the 1790s.83 Finally, common law originalism
remains at best an occasional touchstone in Fourth Amendment cases. The recent Carpenter
decision, holding that acquisition of cell-site locational data from telephone providers, hence
did not even attempt to find analogies in eighteenth-century tort or contract law.84 Gloss, by
contrast, is far more pervasive.
With this analytic foundation in place, I can turn to the three ways in which gloss is
used deployed in Fourth Amendment arguments: as substantive content; as benchmark; and
as substitute.
A.

Gloss as Substantive Content

Of the three varietals of gloss in the search and seizure context, by far the most
prevalent is the first. Gloss is used quite simply to define the content of the constitutional
rule—or, more accurately, to define one element of the constitutional regime. That is, rather
than measure observed official conduct against an extrinsic legal benchmark, the Court has
endogenized the constitutional rule—which defines the minimum procedural obligations of
officials regulated by the Fourth Amendment—to what officials do.
Perhaps the apogee of gloss as substantive content is the Court’s 2001 decision in
Atwater v. Lago Vista, which authorized an arrest pursuant to a misdemeanor traffic offense
that did not itself allow jail time.85 Justice Souter’s majority opinion in Atwater invoked a
historical narrative that began with “pre-founding English common law,” including “divers
Statutes” from the 1285 Statute of Winchester onwards, to “the historical record as it has
unfolded since the framing.”86 In the modern era, Justice Souter then cited treaties published
between 1884 and 1967, and also appealed to “statutes in all 50 States and the District of
Columbia [that] permit warrantless misdemeanor arrests [as well as] a host of congressional
enactments.” 87 Atwater thus developed a historical gloss argument that transcended
common-law arguments, extending both backward and forward in time. Proof of this
extended historical arc served two ends. First, it served to repudiate Atwater’s contention
that warrantless misdemeanor arrests had never been allowed. Second, it was deployed to
substantially undermine the notion that such arrests traduced the “reasonableness” standard
of the Fourth Amendment.

See Sklansky, supra note 18, at 1743 (describing the common law approach as “reading eighteenth-century
common law into the Fourth Amendment”). The criticisms of the common law method that Sklansky
develops, therefore, do not translate to the Fourth Amendment gloss context. Id. at 1762-70.
84 Carpenter v. United States, 558 U.S. --, 2018 WL 3073916, at *7 (June 22, 2018) (describing the question
presented as standing at “the intersection of two lines of cases, both of which inform our understanding of the
privacy interests at stake”).
85 The relevant Texas law at issue in Atwater was a misdemeanor offense “punishable by a fine not less than
$25 or more than $50.” Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 323 (2001) (citing Tx. Transp. Code Ann. §
545.413(d)). The same statute, however, authorized officers to make arrests for violations. Id.
86 Id. at 327-40.
87 Id. at 343-44.
83
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Twenty-five years earlier, the same joint appeal to a common-law history and a
parallel contemporary practice characterized Justice White’s majority opinion in United States
v. Watson affirming “the ancient common-law rule that a peace officer was permitted to
arrest for a misdemeanor or felony committed in his presence as well as for a felony not
committed in his presence if there was reasonable ground for making the arrest.”88 As in
Atwater, the Court in Watson took pains to underscore the persistence of the common-law
rule “substantially intact” until the time of decision.89 Justice White thus cited the American
Law Institute’s proposed (but not enacted) Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Conduct as well
as federal statutes as evidence of “the judgment of the Nation and Congress … to authorize
warrantless public arrests on probable cause.”90 Watson nicely illustrates the oddness of the
gloss approach. The Court very explicitly cited the very existence of the practice challenged
on constitutional grounds as evidence as the constitutionality of that practice.
The fraught and complex domain of automobile searches provides a third illustration
of gloss as substantive content. Traffic stops made up 42 percent of all police-citizen
interactions in 2011 (the last year for which data is available) and roughly 26.4 million
persons age 16 or older indicating that their last contact with police came during a traffic
stops.91 Hence, gloss context has far-reaching consequences for many individuals, since it
regulates their modal interaction with police.
In the Court’s very first encounter with searches of automobiles, Carroll v. United
States, the Justices relied on gloss to define the procedural requisites of such searches to
exclude the warrant requirement.92 Writing for the Court in Carroll, Chief Justice Taft began
his analysis by invoking customs statutes enacted “contemporaneously with the adoption of
the Fourth Amendment.”93 But as in Atwater and Watson, the Court was at pains to show that
the practice extended into the contemporary period, citing a 1917 federal statute and an 1899
Alaska statute that allowed for warrantless vehicular searches to demonstrate that the norm
was unbroken “practically since the beginning of the government.” 94 Obviously, the
references to these later statutes cannot be explained in terms of common law originalism.
Carroll’s account of continuity contrasted with contemporaneous federal courts’
conclusion that the Eighteenth Amendment ruptured the constitutional fabric, and so
necessitated a rethinking of the Fourth Amendment’s constraints on vehicular searches.95
Those courts were also surely cognizant of the dramatic increase in automotive usage in the

423 U.S. 411, 418 (1976).
Id. at 422.
90 Id. at 423-24.
91 Bureau of Justice Statistics, Traffic Stops, available at https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?tid=702&ty=tp
92 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
93 Id. at 151.
94 Id. at 152-53.
95 See, e.g., United States v. Bateman, 278 F. 231, 233 (S.D. Cal. 1922) (arguing that “the Eighteenth
Amendment would have been stillborn” had warrantless vehicular searches been barred). This was not the only
reason for concern about automobiles. Sarah A. Seo, The New Public, 125 YALE L.J. 1616, 1635 (2016)
(documenting judicial anxieties about automobiles’ riskiness to the general public in the 1920s).
88
89
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1910s.96 At least for Chief Justice Taft, Prohibition and the rise of common automobile
usage did not change the analysis. In his private correspondence, Taft stressed a quite
different instrumental justification for the result in Carroll. The automobile, he noted, was
“the greatest instrument for promoting immunity of crimes of violence that I know of in the
history of civilization.”97 The Court’s subsequent decisions endorsed and enlarged the Carroll
rule to encompass containers found in a vehicle. They again stressed the historical continuity
of vehicular-related searches, and the absence of legitimate reliance interests on the part of
drivers.98 The amalgam of eighteenth century common-law and post-ratification gloss hence
proved a duration foundation for the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.
Finally, a variant on gloss as substantive content is the possibility of looking to
legislative action as a source of Fourth Amendment process. In two recent cases concerning
new technologies of locational tracking and cell phone data, Justice Alito has suggested that
the Court should attend, and even pay heightened deference, to legislative judgments on the
Fourth Amendment’s implementation.99 There is no logical reason this analytic frame should
Between 1910 and 1924, the number of registered passenger automobiles in the United States changed from
five hundred thousand to fifteen million five hundred thousand. ROBERT S. LYND & HELEN MERRELL LYND,
MIDDLETOWN: A STUDY IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN CULTURE 253 n.3 (1929).
97 Robert Post, Federalism, Positive Law, and the Emergence of the American Administrative State: Prohibition in the Taft
Court Era, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 125 n.408 (2006) (citation and quotation omitted). Historian Sarah Seo
argues that a shift did occur in suspects’ ability evade arrest as a consequence of automobiles’ mass availability.
Before 1913, when mass production of vehicles took off, “[i]f a law officer had reason to believe that a suspect
was skipping town or fleeing with a cargo of illegal or stolen goods, he usually had ample time to obtain a
warrant for search and arrest”—an impossibility once flight by automobile became available. Sarah A. Seo,
Antinomies and the Automobile: A New Approach to Criminal Justice Histories, 38 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1020, 1031
(2013).
98 United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824 (1982) (finding “no legitimate reliance interest: and noting that “the
rule we apply in this case is faithful to the interpretation of the Fourth Amendment that the Court has followed
with substantial consistency throughout our history”); id. at 820 n.26 (“During virtually the entire history of our
country-whether contraband was transported in a horse-drawn carriage, a 1921 roadster, or a modern
automobile-it has been assumed that a lawful search of a vehicle would include a search of any container that
might conceal the object of the search.”); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 48 (1970) (same). In another line
of cases, the Court has relied on the sheer frequency of police contact with automobiles as a justification for
permitting warrantless searches. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973) (“As a result of our federal
system of government, however, state and local police officers, unlike federal officers, have much more contact
with vehicles for reasons related to the operation of vehicles themselves.”). While largely a decision based on
the eighteenth century common-law, Wyoming v. Houghton contains a brief reference to postratification “practice
under [customs] statutes.” 526 U.S. 295, 302 (1999). I do not think this is enough to rank it as a gloss case. The
Court’s most recent decision on the automobile exception does not dwell on historical continuity. See Collins v.
Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 1663, 1669 (2018) (identifying two policy justifications for warrantless automobile searches).
Since those two justifications were found not to apply to the facts of the case, whereas the historical basis for
the rule would have applied, it should perhaps be unsurprising that Collins was the rare automobile case in
which the defendant prevailed.
99 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 429 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring) (“In circumstances involving dramatic
technological change, the best solution to privacy concerns may be legislative.”); Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct.
2473, 2497 (2014) (Alito, J., concurring) (“I would reconsider the question presented here if either Congress or
state legislatures, after assessing the legitimate needs of law enforcement and the privacy interests of cell phone
owners, enact legislation that draws reasonable distinctions based on categories of information or perhaps
other variables.”). Justice Alito cited an important article by Orin Kerr on institutional competence and
technological change in the Fourth Amendment domain. See Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New
96
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be limited to new enactments. If legislation has already created a basis for stable practice,
Justice Alito’s reasoning would suggest deference. There are, however, few federal enactment
regulating searches and seizures outside the context of electronic communications100 and
national security.101 The former, however, is itself a conforming response to a Supreme
Court decision,102 while the latter is rarely subject to challenge. Nevertheless, Justice Alito’s
suggestions are a useful reminder that a gloss argument need not be cabined to executive
officials. It can also encompass legislative actors.
Across all these cases, to the Court has treated the Fourth Amendment’s procedural
element as endogenous to—indeed, as derivative of—the current and historical practice of
the police. In particular, it leaned heavily on gloss in practically significant cases, such as
those involving vehicular stops and misdemeanor arrests. Indeed, based on those precedents,
it seems plausible to think that in the absence of gloss as substantive content (and without
nothing to serve in its stead), the ordinary law of the Fourth Amendment on the ground
would look very different today.
B.

The Absence of Gloss as the Absence of State Authority

In the jurisprudence of structural constitutionalism, the absence of historical
precedent can serve as a ground for a judicial finding that an official practice falls outside
constitutional bounds. The most stark example of this reasoning, as noted, occurs in the
federalism jurisprudence of anticommandeering. 103 A similar analytic move is found in
Fourth Amendment cases, where the absence of practice is taken as evidence that an action
is not constitutional.
The absence of gloss was central in the Court’s very first landmark Fourth
Amendment decision, the 1886 judgment in Boyd v. United States.104 Boyd arose out of a seizure
of goods alleged to have been imported without payment of duties. 105 Exercising an
authority first granted by a June 1874 federal statute, the U.S. Attorney had demanded that
the importer (Boyd) produce certain invoices at peril of having the facts at issue in the case
found against him.106 The Court held that this “compulsory production of a man's private
papers … to forfeit his property, is within the scope of the fourth amendment,” as well as
Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 805 (2004) [hereinafter “Kerr,
Constitutional Myths”] (“[C]ourts should place a thumb on the scale in favor of judicial caution when technology
is in flux, and should consider allowing legislatures to provide the primary rules governing law enforcement
investigations involving new technologies.”), Kerr himself has subsequently taken a different tack. Orin S. Kerr,
The Effect of Legislation on Fourth Amendment Protection, 115 MICH. L. REV. 1117, 1121 (2017) (“Structural
differences between the Fourth Amendment and investigative legislation make legislation a poor signal of
constitutionally relevant judgments.”).
100 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-22 (governing electronic surveillance during ordinary criminal investigations).
101 See, e.g., Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 § 105(a)(3)(A), 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(3)(A).
102 Kerr, Constitutional Myths, supra note 99, at 847-51 (describing the legislative history of the Wiretapping Act).
103 See supra text accompanying notes 31 to 32; see, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 175-76 (1992).
104 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
105 Id. at 617-18.
106 Id. at 619-20.
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the Fifth Amendment.107 As in other ‘gloss as substantive content’ cases, the Boyd Court
relied both on “[t]he views of the first congress,”108 and also subsequent practice—or rather
the lack thereof. Specifically, the Boyd Court observed that the statutory authority at issue in
that case “was the first legislation of the kind that ever appeared on the statute book of the
United States, and, as seen from its date.” 109 The Court further stressed the “total
unlikeness” of the 1874 provisions to any earlier customs-related legislation.110 In these
passages, Boyd can be fairly read to say that the shape of governmental practice in the past
determines the boundaries of present legal authority: Absence begets absence, just as usage
begets authority. Boyd’s logic is therefore the inverse of precedent such as Atwater, Watson,
and Carroll.
More recently, the absence of analogous historical practices has played a role in
decisions concerning the interaction of new technologies with the Fourth Amendment.
Hence, recall that in Jones v. United States, a unanimous Court held that the placement of a
GPS device on the undercarriage of a suspect’s vehicle constituted a search under the Fourth
Amendment.111 (Jones, I note, is the rare case in which gloss played a role in defining the
threshold scope of the Fourth Amendment’s operation). The majority opinion by Justice
Scalia noted, and the concurring opinion of Justice Alito underscored, the disanalogy
between the kinds of surveillance available to the police during earlier periods of American
history and GPS vehicular tracking.112 Two years later, in Riley v. California, the Court held
that a warrant was required to search a cell phone even when it had been acquired pursuant
to a search incident to arrest.113 Again, the Court underscored the disjunction between the
kind of searches that might have been found on a suspect’s person in the past, and the data
accessible via a cell-phone. Equating the two was “like saying a ride on horseback is
materially indistinguishable from a flight to the moon.”114 In both Jones and Riley, the Court
thus pointed to the absence of any analogous historical practice as a reason for tougher
Fourth Amendment scrutiny.
But technological leaps do not always defeat arguments from gloss. In Maryland v.
King, the Court held that a buccal swab for DNA during an arrest, and the use of that
evidence to match a suspect against evidence from older ‘cold’ cases was reasonable.115 The
Court drew an analogy between DNA identification and the practice of fingerprinting all
suspects that developed in “the middle of the 20th century.”116 It reasoned that because
Id. at 622, 630.
Id. at 630.
109 Id. at 621. The Court further observed that this was a moment of “great national excitement, when the
powers of the government were subjected to a severe strain to protect the national existence.” Id.
110 Id. at 624.
111 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012).
112 Id. at 405 n.3 (discussing the analogy between a constable concealing himself in a coach in the eighteenth
century and twenty-first-century GPS tracking); id. at 958 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) (same).
113 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2495 (2014).
114 Id. at 2488.
115 Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 447 (2013) (affirming reasonableness as touchstone of Fourth Amendment
validity).
116 Id. at 459.
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DNA identification was merely “an advanced technique superior to fingerprinting in many
ways,” it “would make little sense to either the forensic expert or a layperson” to distinguish
them for Fourth Amendment purposes.117 The practical continuity between different means
of suspect identification, the Court reasoned, vouchsafed the legality of DNA testing despite
technological change.118
Uniting the lines of cases described in the last two sections is the Court’s attention to
durable historical practices as a touchstone for determining which police practice counts as
“reasonable.” History can play both a positive and a negative role: It can authorize as much
as it can undermine the state’s claim to power. It makes sense, therefore, to treat these two
lines of cases under the same analytic rubric because history is playing the same role in both.
C.

Gloss as Benchmark

A further, distinct judicial use of state practice is as a benchmarking source of ‘best
practices.’ Examining variation in the policing and prosecutorial practices of different
jurisdictions, the Court can draw an inference about whether a challenged state action is
necessary to achieve public order and safety. The distinctive trait of gloss as benchmark is
interjurisdictional comparison. Gloss as benchmark does not have an easy parallel in other
domains of constitutional law. But it does resemble the practice of “norming” in
administrative law. According to Jonathan Masur and Eric Posner, an agency engaged in
norming picks “a level of strictness that puts significant burdens on industry outliers—the
firms with the worst practices—while putting limited burdens or none at all to the firms
whose practices are of average quality or better”; as a result, the “actual practices of
industries” provides a measure of “the regulatory standard.”119
Perhaps the most practically important use of gloss as benchmark is a case about
remedies rather than the meaning of “reasonableness.” It is the 1967 landmark decision in
Mapp v. Ohio, which extended the exclusionary rule to the states.120 An exclusionary rule
remedy for Fourth Amendment violations had obtained in federal court since 1914.121 When
the Court incorporated the Fourth Amendment against the states in 1949, however, it
declined to extend the exclusionary rule to state criminal trials.122 Mapp hence did not need to
explain why the exclusionary rule was warranted at all. Rather, the Court faced the problem

Id. Underscoring the importance of continuity over time, the Court further rejected the defendant’s
argument that DNA identification took far longer than fingerprinting by looking forward in time to new
technologies that would expedite genetic testing. Id. at 460.
118 The analogy is problematic, however, insofar as few attempts have been made to empirically confirm the
predicate assumption of individual uniqueness that animates fingerprinting, or to examine error rates. Michael
J. Saks & Jonathan J. Koehler, The Coming Paradigm Shift in Forensic Identification Science, 309 SCIENCE 892, 894
(2005). That is, the historical practice on which the King Court hung its hat may be problematically error prone.
119 Jonathan Masur & Eric Posner, Norming in Administrative Law, -- DUKE L. J. -- (forthcoming 2019)
(manuscript at 2).
120 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
121 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
122 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949).
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of explaining why the factual landscape had changed since 1949 so as to legitimate the
expansion of the Fourth Amendment to state courts.
Pivotal to the majority’s explanation was a benchmarking argument drawing on
federal practice. Citing a speech by none other than FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, the Mapp
Court pointedly observed that “it has not been suggested either that the Federal Bureau of
Investigation has …been rendered ineffective” by the imposition of the exclusionary rule in
federal prosecutions.123 Moreover, the Court pointed to its abrogation of the ‘silver platter’
doctrine,’ which had allowed federal officials to share unlawfully secured information with
state counterparts for introduction into a state tribunal.124 Again, the Court suggested that
expanding the exclusionary rule in this fashion had not compromised law enforcement.
Ordinary policing, the Court implied, not only could coexist happily with the exclusionary
rule—it already did coexist with that remedy without public safety being compromised.
A second use of gloss as benchmarking is found in the Court’s consideration of
deadly police force as a form of “seizure.” In Tennessee v. Garner, the Court held that “[deadly]
force may not be used unless it is necessary to prevent the escape and the officer has
probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious
physical injury to the officer or others.”125 Garner framed the question whether deadly force
could be employed in terms of a “balancing” of the individual suspect’s interests at issue on
one side, as against the state’s interests in public order and safety on the other.126 To evaluate
the state’s interests, Justice White’s majority opinion recognized the “fact … that a majority
of police departments in this country have forbidden the use of deadly force against
nonviolent suspects.”127
Garner is notable for the level of detail with which this inquiry was conducted. The
Court reviewed policies adopted by both states and the federal government; it considered
requirements for accreditation by the Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement
Agencies; and it discussed an empirical study by the International Association of Chiefs of
Police.128 It further cited an animus brief joined by Police Foundation, nine national and
international associations of police and criminal justice professionals, the chiefs of police
associations of two states, and thirty-one law-enforcement chief-executives—all of whom
attested to deadly force’s inefficacy.129 This corpus of evidence permitted the Court to reason
that “[i]f those charged with the enforcement of the criminal law have abjured the use of
deadly force in arresting nondangerous felons, there is a substantial basis for doubting that

Mapp, 367 U.S. at 660 (footnote and citation omitted).
Id. at 652.
125 Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 3 (1985).
126 Id. at 7-8 (explaining that the reasonableness of a policing measure is determined by “balancing the extent of
the intrusion against the need for it, has examined the reasonableness of the manner in which a search or
seizure is conducted”).
127 Id. at 10.
128 Id. at 18.
129 Id.; see also Amicus Brief of Police Foundation et al., in Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 3, 1984 Westlaw
566025 (1985).
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the use of such force is an essential attribute of the arrest power in all felony cases.”130 In
effect, the Court surveyed the field of policing practice and determined that Tennessee was
an outlier whose practices warranted no respect.131
A third, more recent, example of gloss as benchmark can be found in the recent
decision excluding cell-phones from the general scope of warrantless searches incident to
arrests.132 In Riley v. California, the Court sought to respond to the concern that an arrestee’s
cell-phone might pose a risk to officer safety because it could be used to alert compatriots in
crime. 133 The Court again engaged in a comparative analysis of policing practices. It
discerned “a number of law enforcement agencies around the country [that] already
encourage the use of Faraday bags,” aluminum bags (akin to sandwich wrapping) that can
simply and quickly be used to isolate a phone.134 The Riley Court could have made this point
without benchmarking. Yet the Court felt compelled to go beyond its bare intuition to make
a comparative argument—which itself is a telling sign of the importance of gloss arguments
in this context.
Finally, gloss as benchmark can be fleetingly glimpsed in the related jurisprudence of
street stops. The landmark Terry v. Ohio opinion—holding that investigative stops were
permitted on a showing of reasonable articulable suspicion—turned largely on the
pragmatics of street stops.135 Chief Justice Warren, however, noted that street stops were a
kind of “swift action predicated upon the on-the-spot observations of the officer on the
beat—which historically has not been … subjected to the warrant procedure.” 136 This
suggests at least awareness of historical practice. More interestingly, the Court’s resolution of
the case—splitting the victory by allowing investigative stops without probable cause, but
still requiring the lower reasonable articulable suspicion standard—was anticipated by an
amicus brief from the National District Attorney’s Association (“NDAA”).137 The NDAA
recommended the Court follow California’s recently adopted rule, which turned on whether
“a reasonable man” would believe, based on the “circumstances,” that a stop was “necessary
to proper discharge” of the officer’s duties.138 Because Chief Justice Warren did not cite the
NDAA brief, it is impossible to be certain that Terry in fact relied on this benchmark. But its
presence in the briefing is evidence that the Court could have inferred the absence of a
Garner, 471 U.S. at 10-11.
Garner, though, is an outlier in its comparative method in this area of Fourth Amendment law. Subsequent
decisions offered more inchoate and ambiguous formulations of the relevant legal rule, such that in general
police are not “on notice of whether a particular use of force is constitutional.” Rachel A. Harmon, When Is
Police Violence Justified?, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1119, 1143 (2008) (developing an extensive critique of the doctrine’s
underspecification).
132 The leading case for the doctrine more generally is Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762–63 (1969) (“When
an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person arrested in order to remove any
weapons that the latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape.”).
133 Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2487 (2014).
134 Id.
135 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
136 Id. at 20.
137 RISA GOLUBOFF, VAGRANT NATION: POLICE POWER, CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND THE MAKING OF
THE 1960S, at 205 (2016).
138 Id. (citation omitted).
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compelling need for police power to make stops without suspicion by reference to
California’s practice.139
As I have described it, gloss as benchmarking is a varied phenomenon. On the one
hand, Mapp and Garner invalidate practices in what Justin Driver calls “holdout”
jurisdictions. 140 The states chastised by those decisions were laggards in relation to an
otherwise uniform time trend of increasing professionalization and sophistication. 141 In
contrast, Riley and Terry rest on comparisons between jurisdictions but do not suggest that
the favored states are a majority or follow a dominant practice. The logic of Riley and Terry is
not the logic of holdouts, but more akin to a search for what in environmental law is called a
“best available technology.”142 In short, gloss as benchmarking can have both a diachronic
(development) and a synchronic form, depending on the set of comparators used.
D.

Gloss as Substitute

Finally, gloss can be employed as a substitute for constitutional protection. More
specifically, the Court’s belief that officials generally engage in certain rights-protecting
practices can support the conclusion that the imposition of consequences for a Fourth
Amendment violation—typically, the suppression of inculpatory evidence—is unjustified.
This is an argument offered at the third and final stage of Fourth Amendment analysis,
where the question is whether exclusion is warranted. But the elimination of the exclusionary
rule means there is no meaningful way to enforce the right against unreasonable searches
and seizures. For where there is no exclusionary remedy, but where state law still requires a
warrant, empirical studies suggest that police “pretty much completely ignored the warrant
requirement.”143 Gloss as substitute, in short, has powerful practical repercussions for legal
compliance.
This deployment of gloss arises in case-law extending and amplifying the Court’s
1984 decision in United States v. Leon, which fashioned a “good-faith exception”' to the
exclusionary rule for “searches conducted pursuant to warrants.” 144 Leon’s exception to
suppression initially applied only to searches based on warrants that were erroneously issued
by a magistrate, unless it was “‘entirely unreasonable’ for an officer to believe, in the
For a similar argument from practicality from observed policing practices, see, e.g., Seth W. Stoughton,
Policing Facts, 88 TUL. L. REV. 847, 873 (2014) (discussing the practicality of warnings during automobile stops
by drawing on training manuals and state practice).
140 Justin Driver, Constitutional Outliers, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 929, 937 (2014) (“An outlier that is a holdout involves
a state law or practice that, although perhaps once prevalent, has now receded and exists in, at most, a few
remaining jurisdictions.”).
141 Id. at 953 (describing the elimination of holdouts as “extinguishing practices that time has left behind”).
142 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(A)(i).
143 David Alan Sklansky, Is the Exclusionary Rule Obsolete?, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 567, 580 (2008) (describing the
experience of California, which requires a warrant for a search of garbage, but which has had no exclusionary
rule since a 1982 referendum). For an early recognition of the remedial vacuum created by the good-faith
exception to suppression as a remedy, see Donald Dripps, Living with Leon, 95 YALE L.J. 906, 907 (1986)
(“[T]he Leon majority has withdrawn that remedy in a class of cases for which no other remedy is available.”).
144 468 U.S. 897, 920-21 (1984).
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particular circumstances of this case, that there was probable cause.”145 But Leon has been
extended piecemeal to cover a far larger fraction of unlawful searches.146 And here gloss has
played a major role.
Two extrusions of Leon rely on gloss as substitute. First, in Hudson v. Michigan, the
Court considered and rejected exclusion as a remedy for the “knock and announce” rule for
home searches.147 Explaining this remedial rationing, Justice Scalia invoked “the increasing
professionalism of police forces” and pointed to a “new emphasis on internal police
discipline” as a result of “wide-ranging reforms in the education, training, and supervision of
police officers.”148 Given these changes in policing, Justice Scalia reasoned, “modern police
forces are staffed with professionals; it is not credible to assert that internal discipline, which
can limit successful careers, will not have a deterrent effect.”149 Unlike Garner, the Hudson
Court did not rely on amicus briefing or empirical evidence of changed practices: Rather, it
cited one historical source and several training manuals as evidence of an empirical trend of
increasing professionalization. 150 It further assumed—without either anecdotal or
quantitative evidence—that increasing professionalization necessarily translated into lower
rates of Fourth Amendment.
The second extension of Leon to rely on gloss as substitute is subtler. In Herring v.
United States, the Court declined to require exclusion when a negligent record-keeping error
led to a mistaken arrest, which in turn revealed contraband.151 Chief Justice Robert’s majority
opinion did not rely on gloss to reach the result that exclusion was “not worth the cost.”152
But the conclusion that negligent errors did not warrant deterrence is hardly self-evident. To
the contrary, it “flies squarely in the face of a host of legal frameworks that presume
negligence to be amenable to deterrence--not the least of which is the predominant theory of
tort remedies.”153 As Justice Ginsburg observed in her dissent, the best explanation for the
Court’s odd assumption that negligence cannot be deterred though institution-wide policies
or safeguards is the majority’s unstated premise that “police departments have become
sufficiently ‘professional’ that they do not need external deterrence to avoid Fourth
Amendment violations.”154 The practice of professionalism, in short, was sub silencio treated
as a “substitute good for the exclusionary rule.”155 Hence, although Herring is not a case in
which the Court leaned explicitly and heavily on gloss as substitute, the premise of
Messerschmidt v. Millender, 132 S. Ct. 1235, 1246 (2012).
See Huq & Lakier, supra note 72, at 1550-51 (describing Leon’s expansion).
147 Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006).
148 Id. at 599 (quoting S. WALKER, TAMING THE SYSTEM: THE CONTROL OF DISCRETION IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE
1950–1990, p. 51 (1993)).
149 Id.
150 Id.
151 Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009).
152 Id. at 144, n.4.
153 Jennifer E. Laurin, Trawling for Herring: Lessons in Doctrinal Borrowing and Convergence, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 670,
683 (2011) (“The Court's assignment of a value of near-zero to the potential of deterring negligent police
conduct amounts to an ipse dixit premise.”).
154 Id. at 156 n.6 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
155 Anthony O'Rourke, Structural Overdelegation in Criminal Procedure, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 407, 421
(2013).
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professional police functioned as a necessary background assumption for a dialing back of
the exclusionary rule.
Developments in the practice of policing, in short, can obviate as well as inform
Fourth Amendment analysis. By no measure is this development the only means of limiting
constitutional protections. Justice Thomas, for example, has recently invoked formalist and
originalist grounds to argue that the exclusionary rule should be abandoned in state
courts156—a move that would, in effect, eliminate the Fourth Amendment as a practical
consideration for most policing.157 If that were to happen, gloss would no longer be the most
consequential valve for adjusting the strength of the Fourth Amendment’s friction on
official behavior. Until then, gloss is likely to be a consequential element of the Fourth
Amendment remedies jurisprudence.
E.

Summarizing The Role of Gloss in Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence

Judicial invocations of gloss pervade Fourth Amendment doctrine. Yet gloss has not
yet been properly noticed or analyzed as a Fourth Amendment phenomenon. In my view,
there are two reasons for this. First, a great deal of scholarly energy in the Fourth
Amendment domain is concentrated on the question of what counts as a “search” such that
constitutional protection is triggered.158 This threshold question attracts scholars because it is
complex and elusive. Fourth Amendment law covers a wide and heterogeneous landscape of
interactions between police and private individuals. The Court must formulate a rule that
addresses chattels, real property, physical touching, electronic searches, communications
acquisition, thermal scans, metadata acquisition, and more.159 The threshold rule must be
alive to the broad array of individual interests in play, and the many ways in which
government can impinge on those interests. Given the theoretical and normative complexity
of this task, it is no surprise scholars have found it so alluring.
Still, it is a mistake to think that the definition of search and seizure exhausts the
stock of important Fourth Amendment questions: The issues of what government action is
“reasonable” and of what remedy attaches to a constitutional violation are in practice just as
important. They are also just as pivotal to whether Fourth Amendment interests are
vindicated. An excessive focus on the question of search, and a relative inattention to the
legal infrastructure that follows, is a recipe for a vapid and ultimately meaningless body of
doctrine.
Collins v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 1663, 1675 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring).
See supra text accompanying note 143.
158 See supra sources cited in note 17.
159 Another reason that the definition of “search” has received so much attention, in my view, is that it is the
natural berth from which to consider questions of technology—which are of obvious and immediate interest to
many. Yet it is a mistake to think about the interaction of technology and the Fourth Amendment in isolation.
At a very minimum, a natural and perhaps inevitable response to greater judicial regulation of technologies such
as cell-phone data and locational trackers is a more aggressive approach to searches and seizures of individuals
in the real world. Carpenter, for example, creates an incentive for officials to seek consent to search suspects’
phones and to acquire historical locational data in at least some cases in which they otherwise would have
approached a telecommunications company (even if this option is by no means always available).
156
157
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Second, because gloss has three different strands, and hence can be used to bolster
or alternatively sap the strength of Fourth Amendment protections, it has no single
normative valance. While gloss as content and gloss as substitute seem to have a generally
statist orientation, the absence of gloss can undermine state power. Gloss as benchmark is
also ambiguous. It was used to constraint state power in Garner, but in Terry enabled more
invasive interventions into urban life. 160 As a result of this shifting valance, Justices of
different ideological colors can invoke gloss to their own ends. In contrast, scholars who
with to argue for either consistently broad or consistently narrow accounts of the Fourth
Amendment cannot simply champion or condemn gloss. Lacking any simple ideological
coding, gloss falls through the cracks.
With that in mind, it has been my aim in this Part to offer a thick description of the
major, if ignored, role that gloss has come to play in this area of constitutional law. Having
installed that account, it is time to consider whether gloss’s outsize rule in the jurisprudence
can be justified.
III.

The Justifications for Fourth Amendment Gloss

It is one thing to say that gloss is ubiquitous. It is another to say that its use is
justified. The Supreme Court has said dismayingly little about the underlying legal and
normative justifications for relying on gloss in the Fourth Amendment context. This Part
therefore asks whether the grounds for gloss’s relevance that have been identified in the
larger constitutional law literature—gloss as acquiescence, gloss as Burkean wisdom, and
gloss as settlement—provide normative ballast here. Working through each of the three
possible grounds of justification identified in Part I, I suggest that there is only limited
justification for the judicial use of gloss in the Fourth Amendment context. Indeed,
application of constitutional law’s larger theoretical framework for the evaluation of gloss
arguments provides reasons to resist many of the specific ways in which the Court has come
to rely upon official practice in the Fourth Amendment domain. If gloss’s use persists,
therefore, it is likely not on any principled ground, but rather as a function of considerations
not directly tied to the values and goals of the Amendment itself.
I examine in turn each of the three standard justifications for giving weight to official
practice or gloss in constitutional analysis. This assumes that the reasons for giving weight to
gloss in the Fourth Amendment context are a subset of those the courts have for attributing
significance to gloss more generally across constitutional law. Since the Court has never
given bespoke reasons for Fourth Amendment gloss, this seems a reasonable assumption.
Out of an abundance of caution, though, I have taken a capacious view of each justificatory
category. This means casting a wide net to consider all possible grounds for relying upon
official practice in the Fourth Amendment context.

Aziz Z. Huq, The Consequences of Disparate Policing: Evaluating Stop and Frisk As A Modality of Urban Policing, 101
MINN. L. REV. 2397 (2017) (documenting costs of stop, question, and frisk programs, and suggesting that these
substantially outweigh the program’s benefits).
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A.

Fourth Amendment Gloss and Institutional Acquiescence

The acquiescence model of gloss assumes a dialogic process between multiple
institutional actors, exercising coordinated constitutional powers in a context of dynamic and
iterative interaction. Treating the resulting practice as gloss requires the assumption that
those actors are themselves responsible for the constitutional judgments behind different
policies. It also assumes a dialogic process in which the constitutionality of a practice is
recognized, and thus legitimated, by a second actor.
There is simply no good way to fit gloss into this dialogic model in the Fourth
Amendment context. Fourth Amendment law is an interaction between the Court and a
highly diffuse and fragmented array of institutions—police departments, magistrates, and
federal investigative entities. State and local law enforcement agencies alone employed about
1,133,000 persons on a full-time basis in 2008.161 Those agencies, moreover, vary greatly in
size and capacity. About half (49%) of all agencies employed fewer than 10 full-time officers.
Nearly two-thirds (64%) of sworn personnel worked for agencies that employed 100 or
more officers.162 As a result, police practice is quite different from the 50 state practice
recognized in Evenwel v. Abbott 163: It is too diffuse and heterogeneity to support facile
generalizations about trends or consensus. Hence, the implicit dialogic process of
acquiescence at work in the separation of powers context simply has no analog in the Fourth
Amendment context. Further, there is no colorable ‘departmentalist’ argument that the
diffuse aggregate of law enforcement bodies covered by the Fourth Amendment are engaged
in collective or parallel constitutional judgments. 164 The gloss as acquiescence template,
therefore, is ill fitted to the Fourth Amendment, whether gloss is being used as substantive
content, benchmark, or substitute.
The heterogeneity of policing raises difficult questions in particular about way in
which the Court has enlarged the scope of the ‘good faith’ exception to the exclusionary
rule. Recall that in cases such as Hudson v. Michigan165 or Herring v. United States,166 the Court
has predicated that exception’s expansion upon an empirical generalization about
increasingly levels of professionalism within police departments. But even within a given
jurisdiction, it has long been known that the policing service delivered to different
neighborhoods can vary dramatically (often along racial or ethnic lines). 167 Given
intrajurisdictional disparities in service quality, and given the likely exacerbation of such
Brian A. Reaves, Census of State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies 1 (2016), available at
https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=2216.
162 Id.
163 Evenwel v. Abbott, 136 S. Ct. 1120 (2016); see supra text accompanying note 34.
164 Can widely used policing manuals be used as evidence of acquiesced-to practice in the policing context? Cf.
Stoughton, supra note 139, at 874-5 & n.185; see also Charles D. Weisselberg, Mourning Miranda, 96 CAL. L. REV.
1519, 1530-37 (2008) (discussing police training manuals’ instructions on interrogations, and suggesting that
those instructions influence practice on the ground).
165 547 U.S. 586 (2006).
166 555 U.S. 135 (2009).
167 One of the first studies to show this was Kenneth R. Mladenka and Kim Quaile Hill, The Distribution of Urban
Police Services, 40 J. POL. 112, 122-24 (1978).
161
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disparities across departments of different sizes, different sociopolitical environments, and
different criminological conditions, generalizations about policing are difficult. In particular,
Herring’s claim that “wide-ranging reforms in the education, training, and supervision of
police officers” had across the board resulted in “the increasing professionalism of police
forces” is hard to substantiate. 168 As I develop further below, the available empirical
evidence suggests we should be very skeptical of that claim.169
Worse, the Court’s good faith jurisprudence not only lacks a clear theoretical account
of gloss, it also has no stable empirical methodology to evaluate how to establish the veracity
of a general descriptive claim about police in general. Hence, the Court has no way to
determine how many police departments fall at the lower end of the professionalism
spectrum, or to ascertain whether they are concentrated in impoverished or racially
segregated communities (as is indeed likely the case.)170 Instead, cases such as Hudson and
Herring manifest at best an indifference to the plight of communities that are still burdened
by suboptimal policing.
Despite these limits to the application of gloss as acquiescence here, there is a
dialogic process of interbranch deliberation at work in Fourth Amendment law. But it is not
one that would support an inference of gloss in any of the forms observed in the current
case law—and it is one that undermines any further doctrinal accounting for other actors’
acquiescence. The Fourth Amendment already draws upon the substantive judgments of
state and national legislatures to calibrate its protections because it implicitly relies on the
substantive ambit of the criminal law. 171 Definitions of probable cause and reasonable
articulable suspicion, that is, already depend on the range of crimes that a legislature chooses
to enact. Narrowing the scope of substantively criminal behavior makes it more different (all
else being equal) for police to conduct searches and make seizures. For example, criminal
conspiracies, even if they are in some respects costly to investigate and prosecute,172 may be a
boon to police because their undemanding actus reus requirements make it easier to obtain a
warrant or otherwise justify a search. The incorporation of substantive criminal law into the
Fourth Amendment calculus means that legislators already have a say about the strength of
Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006).
See infra text accompanying notes 212 to 242.
170 One measure of differences in quality is public trust in the police. Careful ecological studies find that “race
remains a significant predictor of perceptions of unjust police practices, even after taking into account the
ecological structuring of neighborhoods and their perceived environmental context.” John MacDonald et al.,
Race, neighborhood context and perceptions of injustice by the police in Cincinnati, 44 URBAN STUD. 2567, 2567-68 (2007);
see also Elaine B. Sharp & Paul E. Johnson, Accounting for variation in distrust of local police, 26 JUST. Q. 157, 157-58
(2009) (finding racial differences after controlling for individual and neighborhood level explanations of trust in
police). These studies suggest that differences in police quality disproportionately impact minority groups.
Hudson and Herring, in this light, are at a minimum instances of judicial indifference to the state’s treatment of
minorities.
171 William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV. 780, 802 (2006) (noting that
constitutional law makes crime definition “politically easier” than other mechanisms for altering the nature and
scope of the criminal justice process).
172 Cf. William J. Stuntz, Unequal Justice, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1969, 2028 (2008) [hereinafter “Stuntz, Unequal
Justice”(“[Conspiracy] crimes are more costly to investigate and prosecute than one-on-one criminal
transactions.”).
168
169

- 30 Electroniccopy
copyavailable
available at:
at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3224455
Electronic
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3224455

constitutional protections. Hinging a judgment of what is “reasonable” on their
acquiescence, therefore, is in effect to give legislatures two bites at the Fourth Amendment
apple.
In recent decades, moreover, legislatures have not used their discretionary influence
over Fourth Amendment law in a necessarily wise fashion. At the federal level, where the
scope of criminal law is most closely studied, it is estimated that Congress adds about fifty
new criminal statutes each year, without necessarily removing any old ones from the
books.173 Crime rates have not followed the same steady upward path—quite the contrary.174
Acquiescence by legislators to increasing police power is thus not a rational response to
changes in the crime rate. It rather flows from a bidding war between political parties
striving to compute for a punitive public’s affections.175 It seems no coincidence that public
attitudes to crime, and in particular the public’s fear of crime, has not declined—again, quite
the contrary.176 It is seems likely that national politicians’ reckless rhetorical choices have
played a large role in this development 177 Hence, it seems most plausible to categorize
legislative behavior as “pathological,” to use a term first deployed by Bill Stuntz.178
If one is cynical about the reasons that legislators have for enlarging each year the
scope of substantive criminal law—and there is no shortage of reasons for cynicism—then
the correct response might be extend Orin Kerr’s equilibrium-adjustment theory to
encompass legislative changes. Kerr argues that courts should strive to maintain an
equilibrium between the scope of police power and the domain of individual privacy. While
Kerr applies his equilibrium-adjustment model to “changing technology and social practice,”
by contending that if “new tools and new practices threaten to expand or contract police
power in a significant way, courts [do and should] adjust the level of Fourth Amendment
protection to try to restore the prior equilibrium,”179 there is no reason to cabin the analysis
in this way. If courts respond to exogenous shocks such as technology and diffuse social
practice, there is no reason they should not also compensate for legislative changes to the
scope of criminal law. On this view, the appropriate judicial response to legislative changes
Todd Haugh, Overcriminalization's New Harm Paradigm, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1191, 1198 (2015).
Fed. Bureau Investigation: Uniform Crime Reporting, Crime in the United States (2014),
https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2014/crime-in-the-u.s.-2014/tables/table-1 (describing an overall decline
in violent crimes--murder, rape robbery, aggravated assault--and nonviolent crimes--property crimes, burglary,
larceny, and motor vehicle theft--between 1995 and 2014).
175 For a summary of evidence of the public’s punitive preferences, and the bidding war dynamic, see Huq &
Lakier, supra note 72, at 1584–85.
176 In the election year of 2016, for example, fear of crime was at rates that had not been seen since 2001.
Alyssa Davis, In U.S., Concern About Crime Climbs to 15-Year High, GALLUP (Apr. 6, 2016),
http://www.gallup.com/poll/190475/americans-concern-crime-climbs-yearhigh.aspx.
177 John J. Donohue, Comey, Trump, and the Puzzling Pattern of Crime in 2015 and Beyond, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1297,
1302 (2017) (concluding that “Comey and Trump probably contributed to the increase in the public's
apprehension of crime, which likely aided Trump's law-and-order candidacy”).
178 See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 513-18 (2001)
[hereinafter “Stuntz, Pathological Politics”] (offering a now classic political economy account of the inflationary
dynamics of criminal legislation).
179 Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125 HARV. L. REV. 476, 480 (2011)
[hereinafter “Kerr, Equilibrium Adjustment”].
173
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in crime policy is not so much acquiescence. Rather, courts should offer an equal and
opposition resistance to the pressure imposed on the criminal justice system by the one-way
legislative hydraulic. This would mean a countervailing Fourth Amendment ratchet that responded
to the dynamic legislative and presidential politics of crime by incrementally circumscribing
the reach of police power.
It is obvious that this is not the Fourth Amendment that we have. Rather, our
Fourth Amendment has gradually lost force through time, in particular through the
expansion of the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, even as the scope of criminal
law has expanded. Given the way in which the federal judiciary closely track contemporary
political preferences,180 it seems fair to doubt that a contrapuntal constitutional law is even
plausible. Indeed, even as its most seemingly countermajoritanian, the Supreme Court itself
stuck closely to broadly shared views of appropriate policing.181 In sum, if we do have a
doctrine that moves in rough lockstep with the increasing punitiveness of legislatures, this is
not an example of ‘acquiescence’: It is rather a failure of institutional design flowing from the
tight linkage between judicial preferences and the policy judgments of nationally elected
officials.
B.

Fourth Amendment Gloss as Burkean Wisdom

The second argument for using gloss in the Fourth Amendment context is epistemic.
Official practice merits judicial respect, on this account, because it is a distillation of hardwon wisdom about the tools needed to suppress crime. Recognition of this epistemic
asymmetry requires judges not merely to adopt a posture of deference in respect to specific
policy arguments proffered by the police, but also to incorporate the collective, hard-won
wisdom of police agencies into the very fabric of the doctrine. This line of argument can be
discerned in cases that employ gloss as substantive content—including the misdemeanor
warrantless arrest and vehicular search lines of precedent—and that use gloss as substitute.
Even the gloss as benchmark cases rest on an assumption that wisdom is to be derived from
police practice, but assume that the wisdom is not evenly spread across policing agencies.
As plausible as these arguments sound at first blush, they are beset by deep
theoretical and empirical difficulties. To see this, it is necessary to start with a definition of
reasonableness against which the Court’s judgments can be measured. I use here a relatively
undemanding and uncontroversial one: An official practice such as warrantless misdemeanor
arrests or warrantless vehicular searches can be plausibly ranked as reasonable, I posit, only if
its net social benefits are positive. A practice that externalized greater costs than the benefits
it generated could not plausibly be ranked as reasonable: A decision to forego that practice

On the weakness of judicial independence from contemporary political control, see Aziz Z. Huq, Democratic
Erosion and the Courts: Comparative Perspectives, 93 NYU L. REV. ONLINE 21, 28 (2018).
181 Even in the supposedly halcyon days of the Warren Court, constitutional criminal procedure doctrine was
substantially less countermajoritarian than commonly assumed. See Corinna Barrett Lain, Countermajoritarian
Hero or Zero? Rethinking the Warren Court's Role in the Criminal Procedure Revolution, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1361, 137982, 1394, 1411 (2004).
180
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would improve social welfare—which is what a constitutional rule would entail. 182 To
demand that policing practices advance social welfare (however defined) is not to demand
that they achieve the maximum amount of crime suppression a given expenditure, or that
they be the best “feasible” approach to the problem of maintaining social order.183 It is more
modesrly to ask that they help more than they hurt. It is thus an appropriate way of giving
some minimal and uncontroversial content to the inchoate term “reasonable” against which
the Court’s use of gloss can be compared.
With this benchmark in mind, there are three reasons for rejecting gloss as Burkean
wisdom. I spell each out in brief first, and then develop them in detail below. First, the
political economy of policing—as shaped in particular by influential actors such as police
unions, insurers, and municipal governments—is not consistent with the production and
sustaining of behavior that on net produces greater benefits than costs. Second, the
descriptive premise of police expertise—which is a distinct concept from police
professionalism—is questionable. To the extent that the case for gloss is epistemic in
character, it requires that officials themselves acquire information upon which to make
sensible judgments. There is scant reason to believe this occurs in the policing context.
Finally, to the extent that it is any historical durability to a police practice that attracts judicial
deference, the argument for gloss as Burkean wisdom fails to account for the shifting
assumptions and justifications that animate the practice of police. What seems like a stable
practice from one perspective can, when viewed in light of the changing missions and
priorities of police, appears instead as a multiplicity of tactics sharing only a superficial
similarity. Together, these three points substantially undermine the force of judicial reliance
on official practice on Burkean wisdom grounds.
1.

Gloss and the Political Economy of Policing

An unstated assumption of Burkean accounts of Fourth Amendment gloss is that
the political economy of policing—that is, the network of social, political, and institutional
vectors that generate policing practice—will not predictably embrace practices that impose
costs larger than the benefits they create. My aim in this section is to cast doubt on that
assumption by focusing attention on the key institutional actors whose preference determine
the shape of policing. The observed preferences and incentives of these actors will not
conduce, I argue, to cost-justified policing measures, but rather to measures that predictably
externalize costs without commensurate gains in public safety.
I assume a capacious account of costs and benefits that includes the non-monetized privacy and dignity
values that different jurists have perceived as furthered by the Fourth Amendment. Compare Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (privacy as touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis),
with id. at 369-72 (Black, J., dissenting) (focusing on “physical” or “actual intrusion” and dealt with seizures of
“tangible[ ]” items), and Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966) (“The overriding function of the
Fourth Amendment is to protect personal privacy and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the State.”)
183 That is, the constitutional analysis is distinct from feasibility analysis in the regulatory context, in which an
agency will “examine only whether a particular level of regulation is technologically and economically feasible:
whether the technological means exist to implement the regulation, and whether the regulation will cause
significant economic harm.” Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Against Feasibility Analysis, 77 U. CHI. L. REV.
657, 663 (2010).
182
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A caution is warranted up front: The idea that policing measures might be unjustified
in pure cost-benefit terms has recently been applied to specific policing measures, such as
stop-and-frisk,184 and also to the criminal justice system as a whole.185 My approach here is
not to analysis discrete practices. Rather, I focus in the incentives of pivotal actors in the
criminal justice system. I suggest that the incentives of these actors are to “overuse the most
punitive and immediately rewarding criminal justice tools .... and underuse others …. which
probably generate positive externalities.186
The practice of policing responds to pressures from police unions (who represent
the rank and file officers themselves); the management and political leadership of a
municipality (or whatever other jurisdictional unit police are organized); and (outside of large
cities at least) insurers.187 None of these forces conduces clearly toward compliance with
constitutional rules; indeed, none of them has a clear incentive to press toward cost-justified
policing measures. As a result, it is exceedingly unlikely that police departments—even if
subject to contemporary forms of management and political oversight—will endeavor to
maximize compliance with constitutional rights, or even to minimize the negative
externalities of policing.
Let us start with unions. These have long been understood to be a major influence
on the forms and practices of policing.188 Rejuvenated police unions emerged in the 1970s,
mobilizing around demands for contractual protections for officers charged with disciplinary
offenses.189 The collective bargaining agreements (“CBAs”) reached by police unions now
often contain procedural protections for internal investigations that impede all efforts to
verify the facts of discrete incidents. Among other measures, these agreements often delay
misconduct-related interviews; allow the accused access to evidence before being
interviewed; bar the investigation of anonymous complaints; and limit the duration of
investigations.190 The net effect of these bespoke procedural protections is to reduce the rate

Huq, Disparate Consequences, supra note 160, at 2413-20.
Richard A. Bierschbach & Stephanos Bibas, Rationing Criminal Justice, 116 MICH. L. REV. 187, 189 (2017) (“In
economic terms, criminal justice presents a classic case of externalities, particularly negative externalities.
Individual actors, agencies, and different levels of government benefit from pursuing individually rational
actions but do not suffer the costs they individually and collectively impose upon others.”).
186 Id. at 189.
187 I focus here on the structural, organized forces that shape police behavior. Another lens would train on
demographic changes, although it is not clear that recent changing racial patterns in hiring have made much of
a difference. See David Alan Sklansky, Not Your Father's Police Department: Making Sense of the New Demographics of
Law Enforcement, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1209, 1209 (2006).
188 Catherine L. Fisk & L. Song Richardson, Police Unions, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 712, 720 (2017) (flagging “a
general scholarly consensus that police unions play an important role in policing and politics”).
189 Samuel Walker, The Neglect of Police Unions: Exploring One of the Most Important Areas of American Policing, 9
POLICE PRAC. & RES. 95, 95-97 (2008); see also Seth W. Stoughton, The Incidental Regulation of Policing, 98 MINN.
L. REV. 2179, 2207 (2014) (discussing the spread of collective bargaining among police, and noting that only
five states now prohibit such bargaining).
190 Stephen Rushin, Police Union Contracts, 66 DUKE L.J. 1191, 1222 (2017); Aziz Z. Huq & Richard H.
McAdams, Litigating the Blue Wall of Silence: How to Challenge the Police Privilege to Delay Investigation, 2016 U. CHI.
184
185
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at which allegations of unconstitutional conduct are identified, to increase the cost of
investigating such allegations, and in net to reduce both the extent to which police
management are aware of illegalities and the extent to which they are capable of responding
to them. 191 Beyond these systemic effects, there is some evidence that unionization is
associated with a stricter, more coercive form of policing. 192 In short, the available
quantitative and qualitative studies of police unionization suggest that this powerful force
will press for institutional practices that maximize the extent to which the costs of policing
are externalized to the public, minimize information about those externalities, and elicit more
aggressive and coercive tactics.
Can these forces be controlled by either expertise or democratic politics, though?
Managerial controls on the behavior of rank-and-file offices, to be sure, might in theory be
expected to constrain some of these tendencies. But in practice they are not likely to do so to
any great extent.193 Empirical studies suggest that management is distrusted by rank-and-file
officers, especially when it comes to disciplinary factors. 194 The dispersed and largely
unobservable character of street policing also means that management often lack
information about street-level behavior, where the majority of costly police action occurs. As
Wesley Skogan has observed, “[m]ost police officers work alone or with a partner, and the
top brass know little about what they do out there except what they report on pieces of
paper that they sometimes fill out to document their activities.”195 Typically management
responds to this epistemic dilemma by tracking only outcomes, such as the volume of
arrests, that are only loosely correlated with the cost-justified creation of public order.196 This
is a deeply perverse quality to an arrest metric for policing success. Arrests for minor
LEGAL F. 213, 226 (2016); Kevin M. Keenan & Samuel Walker, An Impediment to Police Accountability? An
Analysis of Statutory Law Enforcement Officers' Bills of Rights, 14 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 18, 2435 (2005).
191 Huq & McAdams, supra note 190, at 237 (“Delay privileges suppress that information even within the police
department. Absent strong leadership from police management, it is likely that the signal of low rates of
problematic police force will be treated as evidence that police comply with relevant limits on the use of
force.”); Harmon, supra note 131, at 799 (“Collective bargaining rights deter department-wide changes intended
to prevent constitutional violations”).
192 J. M. Magenau & R.G. Hunt, Police Unions and the Police Role, 49 HUMAN REL. 1315, 1330-31 (1996).
193 On the acute separation of rank-and-file from management within police departments, see ELIZABETH
REUSS-IANNI, TWO CULTURES OF POLICING: STREET COPS AND MANAGEMENT COPS (1983); see also Akiva M.
Liberman et al., Routine Occupational Stress and Psychological Distress in Police, 25 POLICING 421, 423, 432 (2002)
(documenting lack of rapport and trust). On street policing culture, see JAMES Q. WILSON, VARIETIES OF
POLICE BEHAVIOR: THE MANAGEMENT OF LAW AND ORDER IN EIGHT COMMUNITIES 33-34 (1968) (finding
police had “a preoccupation with maintaining self-respect, proving one's masculinity, ‘not taking any crap,’ and
not being ‘taken in.”’).
194 See MICHAEL K. BROWN, WORKING THE STREET 9 (1981) (noting that patrol officers “must cope not only
with the terror of an often hostile and unpredictable citizenry, but also with a hostile--even tyrannical--and
unpredictable bureaucracy”). Early sociological work found that street police view themselves as a “conflict
group,” working in isolation, likely to came to “regard the public as an enemy” with great speed. William A.
Westley, Secrecy and the Police, 34 SOC. FORCES 254, 256 (1956). The development of a “quasi-military” style of
management in the twentieth century, moreover, ha had the “insidious” effect that managers are perceived as
“mere disciplinarians.” EGON BITTNER, ASPECTS OF POLICE WORK 136, 143 (1990).
195 Wesley G. Skogan, Why Reforms Fail, 18 POLICING & SOC'Y 23, 24 (2008).
196 Michael Tonry, From Policing to Parole: Reconfiguring American Criminal Justice, 46 CRIME & J. 1, 12 (2017); accord
Stuntz, Pathological Politics, supra note 178, at 538 (“[P]olice are more likely to maximize arrests.”).
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infractions in particular—quite apart from the costs they impose on suspects—may be
unjustified solely in terms of “lost crime prevention opportunities.”197 Of particular relevance
here, there is good reason to believe that the kind of misdemeanor warrant arrests embraced
on the basis of gloss in Atwater have no deterrence effect on serious crime.198
The existence of pervasive deficiencies of trust and information implies that
managerial control is likely to be incomplete. There is every reason to anticipate that
information will not be candidly conveyed by the rank-and-file, especially when it concerns
potentially tortious behavior that externalizes costs to civilians. 199 Consistent with this
diagnosis of limited managerial control because of the distance between managers and their
subordinates, 200 larger police departments experience higher rates of misconduct than small
ones.201 Larger departments, all things being equal, are likely to have greater agency slack, so
this is not surprising. All else being equal, therefore, we should not anticipate that
management will intervene and limit conduct that is unjustified because it externalizes more
costs than the benefits it creates.
These limits of managerial influence on police rank and file, coupled to the sway of
police unions, also constrain the effect of elected officials’ preferences on police behavior.
Elected officials, after all, work through management to influence the contours of street
policing. Political control can be exercised at either a state or a local level. Today, state laws
“cover at best only a small portion of police management issues and day-in day-out police
activities.”202 In contrast, the historical record of local political control of police departments
finds that the latter were functionally “adjunct[s] of the [political] machine,” and as such
powered by patronage and graft.203 Celebrations of local, democratic influence of policing fail
to grapple with this recalcitrant record, which undercuts optimism about the valence of
democratic policing.204 Neither state nor local control of policing, therefore, appears to be
robustly welfare enhancing.

Cynthia Lum & Daniel S. Nagin, Reinventing American Policing, 46 CRIME & J. 319, 344-45 (2017).
Id. at 353.
199 Barbara E. Armacost, Organizational Culture and Police Misconduct, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 453, 501 (2004).
200 Ulrika Haake, Oscar Rantatalo, and Ola Lindberg, Police leaders make poor change agents: leadership practice in the
face of a major organisational reform, 27 POLICING & SOC. 764, 764 (2017) (finding, based on 28 case studies that
“the idea that police leaders will be able to function as agents of change promoting organisational reform is
highly uncertain”).
201 David Eitle, Stuart J. D’Alessio and Lisa Stolzenberg, The Effect of Organizational and Environmental Factors on
Police Misconduct, 17 POLICE Q 103, 113 (2014).
202 Samuel Walker, Governing the American Police: Wrestling with the Problems of Democracy, 2016 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
615, 620 (2016).
203 ROBERT M. FOGELSON, BIG-CITY POLICE 13-19 (1977).
204 For a more optimistic picture of “local justice” that does not carefully attention to countervailing evidence,
see Stuntz, Unequal Justice, supra note 172, at 1982-97. Stuntz’s account mentions the effect of machine politics
on urban policing, id. at 1995-96, but rather bizarrely spins these as positive effects. Rather, the main body of
historical evidence “shows in convincing depth and detail that informal administration, localized politics, and
freedom from professional norms produced dysfunctional systems” in stark contrast to Stuntz’s partial picture.
Stephen J. Schulhofer, Criminal Justice, Local Democracy, and Constitutional Rights, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1045, 1050
(2013).
197
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Moreover, where we are able to observe directly elected officials’ influence on
policing, we do not see a tendency to gravitate toward cost-justified outcomes. Rather, there
is a bent toward regressive and unjustified decision-making. A particularly salient body of
evidence concerns the distribution of fiscal resources within states. Spending patterns, which
reflect the aggregate views of many local leaders, can be examined to determine whether
these are better explained by patterns of crime or by the concentration of racial and ethnic
groups. Even in areas where a racial or ethnic minority has a measure of political control,
such as in the American southwest, studies have found socioeconomic class and proximity to
the border—and not crime—best predict the fiscal allocation of policing resources.205 More
generally, “empirical research also provides considerable support for the argument that both
the resources and the coercive strategies of policing are distributed in accordance with the
racial and ethnic makeup of communities.”206
This does not mean that minority communities obtain more or better protection
than majority ones. Indeed, the rate of civil rights complaints against police is also a function
of the minority (black and Hispanic) share of the population.207 Although not dispositive,
these patterns suggest that political control of policing, even if possible to extend beyond
relatively coarse metrics such as funding, would not necessarily result the choice of costjustified tactics. Democratic control of policing more generally cannot be expected to yield
cost-justified measures where there is an observable minority that can be expected to bear
the brunt of negative externalities without being able to change electoral outcomes.208
Recent literature has turned to the role of insurance companies in supplying the
incentives for police to behave in cost-justified ways. One commentator suggests that “an
insurer writing police liability insurance may profit by reducing police misconduct,” and that
“the insurer may be better positioned than the government to reform police behavior.”209
But insurers are motivated to install loss prevention programs only to the extent that they
anticipate liability. Most cost-unjustified behavior—such as minor uses of force that leave no
Malcolm D. Holmes et al., Minority threat, crime control, and police resource allocation in the Southwestern United States,
54 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 128 (2008).
206 Id. at 129; see also Robert J. Kane, The Social Ecology of Police Misconduct, 40 CRIMINOLOGY 867, 867, 887-88
(2002) (discussing distributions of police force in New York City between the 1970s and the 1990s, and finding
increasing usage of disproportionate police force in minority neighborhoods, particularly when that minority
was perceived as a demographic threat to the majority)
207 Malcolm D. Holmes, Minority threat and police brutality: Determinants of civil rights criminal complaints in US
municipalities, 38 CRIMINOLOGY 343, 344-45 (2000); see also Roland G. Fryer, Jr., An Empirical Analysis of Racial
Differences in Police Uses of Force 3 (July 2016), http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/fryer/files/main-july_2016.pdf
(finding “large racial differences” in police use of “non-lethal force,” including slapping, grabbing, and pushing
individuals into a wall or onto the ground in the Terry stop-related records of New York’s police)..
208 This is true even in minority-majority jurisdictions, where elected and appointed leaders can be driven by the
sheer scale of violence to adopt ineffectual policies, such as massive numbers of investigative car searches that
have “racial discrimination inherent in th[eir] structure.” JAMES FORMAN JR., LOCKING UP OUR OWN: CRIME
AND PUNISHMENT IN BLACK AMERICA 202 (2017); see id. at 215 (noting the many alternative policies that could
have yielded public safety with fewer externalities). Foreman’s larger theme is the way in which even wellmeaning minority leaders can be constrained by a variety of exogenous legal and institutional forces, and
thereby forced into deeply harmful policing choices.
209 John Rappaport, How Private Insurers Regulate Public Police, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1539, 1543–44 (2017).
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broken bones or visible marks, or unlawful searches that generate no lasting damage—will
not yield tort suits. It seems likely that many who experience compensable harms do not sue
because of the transaction costs of the civil justice system, to say nothing of qualified
immunity and other bespoke barriers to relief in the constitutional tort context.210 If insurers’
incentives to reform are circumscribed by the shadow of liability, and liability often does not
extend very far, then the case for thinking that insurers will ameliorate unjustified police
behavior is necessarily too weak to be convincing.211
In short, the assumption that police will elect cost-justified tactics is in tension with
the preferences of line police as manifested by their union representatives in CBAs, the
weakness of managerial reform power, and the limited incentives of political actors to
ameliorate socially unjustified patterns of policing. These forces will tend to externalize social
cost in particular to racial and ethnic minorities, rather than pressing toward cost-justified
policing. Insurers’ intervention is unlikely to ameliorate the police tendency to externalize
social cost. As a result, the official practice covered by the Fourth Amendment will often not
break even in social welfare terms. If that practice often imposes greater costs than benefits,
it is hard indeed to see why it should be ranked as “reasonable” under any plausible
definition of that term. That is, observed policing practice is not a reliable source of
information about what is a “reasonable” search or seizure because there is no reason to
believe it will systematically gravitate toward cost-justified norms. This suggests that the
gloss as substantive content cannot be based on Burkean
2.

The Elusive Concept of Police Expertise

A second basis for treating gloss as a distillate of Burkean wisdom would look to the
ability of the police to accumulate and act on information that only they have access to about
the costs and benefits of their policy choices. The central problem with this argument is that
its central premise of epistemic competence is false.
Police departments simply do not collect the information necessary to make
informed judgments on what policies are cost justified. Rather, as Rachel Harmon has
documented, police departments tend to “limit rather than promote information
availability,” and often fail to create or publicize information that is necessary for sensible
regulation of policing.212 She explains this in terms of the “significant counter-incentives”
related to liability and negative publicity that lead police management to “underinvest in
research” that could improve the quality of policing213 Even records generated internally,
Huq & Lakier, supra note 72, at 1548-56 (documenting barriers to suit).
The leading work recognizes the “theoretical indeterminacy and the lack of any confident answers to the
related empirical questions” of the welfarist claim. Rappaport, supra note 209, at 1596.
212 Rachel Harmon, Why Do We (Still) Lack Data on Policing?, 96 MARQUETTE L. REV. 1119, 1129 (2013)
[hereinafter “Harmon, Why Do We (Still) Lack Data”]. For example, more than 40% of police departments
nationwide, according to one 2009 study, do not require any written report when officers use a “twist lock or
wristlock” on a civilian. CHARLES R. EPP, MAKING RIGHTS REAL: ACTIVISTS, BUREAUCRATS, AND THE
CREATION OF THE LEGALISTIC STATE 251 (2009) (also noting that only 32% of departments required a report
after using a “firm grip” on a civilian).
213 Harmon, Why Do We (Still) Lack Data, supra note 212, at 1131.
210
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such as disciplinary documentation, are often hedged with legal constraints, such as CBAmandated expungement regimes, that limit their utility.214 For example, the authority of
internal affairs units to generate reliable information about police conduct is often
constrained by rules that require them to elicit information only in writing and only after
giving suspects up to a week to respond.215
Another potential source of information about externalities is the body of lawsuits
filed against police based on federal or state law violations. Because these suits tend almost
uniformly to be indemnified,216 it would in theory be simple for that government to evaluate
how much police misconduct is costing—although note that even this is just a lower bound
on actual costs, since not all constitutional tortfeasors will be sued. But even in respect to this
one limited set of cost data, municipalities often fall short. Extensive research by Joanna
Schwartz has demonstrated that most departments ignore lawsuits that do not generate
negative publicity; that municipal counsel defend most suits without regard to their merits;
that settlements and judgments are paid by the municipalities and not the department; and
that departments fail to track of officers named as defendants, evidence presented against
them, or even payouts.217 Hence, even when there is a ready, if incomplete, record of actions
that plainly fail to comply with existing legal standards and that externalize costs, police
departments routinely fail to acquire or use that information. The assumption of epistemic
competence upon which gloss as Burkean wisdom is based, therefore, falls woefully short of
reality.
The fragility of police claims to epistemic advantage is consistent with recent
historical work exploring of the origins of judicial deference in the criminal justice space.
The bold assertion of police “expertise” is a historical artifact of the police professionalism
movement of the 1950s.218 As Anna Lvovsky’s recent historical scholarship demonstrates,
judicial decisions invoked “the police’s criminological insights as grounds for deference
under the Fourth Amendment” despite a “wealth of evidence questioning the value of police
expertise.”219 She describes the emergence of a judicial understanding of police work “as a
Rushin, supra note 190, at 1222.
Craig B. Futterman et al., The Use of Statistical Evidence to Address Police Supervisory and Disciplinary Practices: The
Chicago Police Department's Broken System, 1 DEPAUL J. SOC. JUST. 251, 275 (2008). On the weakness of such units,
see G. Flint Taylor, A Litigator's View of Discovery and Proof in Police Misconduct Policy and Practice Cases, 48 DEPAUL
L. REV. 747, 756 (1999).
216 Study after study finds pervasive indemnification of individual officers. See, e.g., Joanna C. Schwartz, Police
Indemnification, 89 NYU L. REV. 885, 890 (2014); Lant B. Davis et al., Suing the Police in Federal Court, 88 YALE L J
781, 810–12 (1979) (reporting government defense and indemnification of police officers in Connecticut);
Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart Schwab, The Reality of Constitutional Tort Litigation, 72 CORNELL L REV 641, 686
(1987).
217 Joanna C. Schwartz, Myths and Mechanics of Deterrence: The Role of Lawsuits in Law Enforcement Decisionmaking, 57
UCLA L. REV. 1023, 1037-40 (2010). Schwartz’s subsequent research shows that in a small number of
jurisdictions, including Los Angeles, Seattle, Portland, Denver, and Chicago, such information used a “valuable
source e of information about police-misconduct allegations.” Joanna C. Schwartz, What Police Learn from
Lawsuits, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 841, 845 (2012). There is nothing inevitable, therefore, about the failure to use
information that is on hand concerning police wrongdoing.
218 Lvovsky, supra note 20, at 1999-2000.
219 Id. at 2025.
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task capable of producing ratified and systematic ‘expert’ knowledge as a result of judges
exposure to police as putative experts and reformers across a range of contexts.”220 On
Lvovsky’s accounts, the presumption of police expertise has never been based on a
demonstration of actual expertise.
Gloss as Burkean wisdom, in sort, can no more be justified on the basis that police
are more knowledgeable than on the basis that they are motivated by socially desirable
incentives and organizational forces.
3.

The Evolving Modalities of Policing

A final problem impedes the argument for gloss as Burkean wisdom. The standard
Burkean account hinges on the idea that “the past has an authority of its own which,
however circumscribed, is inherent and direct rather than derivative.”221 As Burke himself
put it, when making “practical” decisions about “the science of government,” one should be
aware that “however sagacious and observing he may be, it is with infinite caution than any
man ought to venture upon pulling down an edifice which has answered in any tolerable
degree, for ages the common purposes of society, or on building it up again, without having
models and patterns of approved utility before his eyes.”222 It is, though, to be doubted
whether policing is “an edifice which has answered in any tolerable degree, for ages the
common purposes of society.” Police roles have not been fixed over time, and they have not
been focused on a “common” purpose over their history. Rather, the central task of police is
to solve “problems” in public order as they arise.223 The nature of the problems that policing
is supposed to solve, though, has changed dramatically over time. 224 As a result, the
substance of police has an evolving, mutative quality. This is evident from even a rapid
summary of the development of policing since it’s advent some 180 years ago.
The first police forces, which emerged in cities like Philadelphia and Charleston in
the 1820s and 1830s, took very different trajectories. 225 In southern cities, police were
primarily tasked with maintaining the peace of slavery.226 Through the end of Jim Crow in
the 1960s, southern police “represented the South's repressive civil order and the ideology of
white supremacy overall.”227 In northern cities, through much of the nineteenth century,
Id. at 2053-67; id. at 1067-68 (describing the “foundations of judicial deference “ to police as “numerous
structural presumptions and aggregate biases refracted through the judicial process”).
221 Anthony T. Kronman, Precedent and Tradition, 99 YALE L.J. 1029, 1047 (1990).
222 Id. at 451. I have not corrected the gendered word usage in Kronman, but it should be understood that I do
not endorse its sexist assumption.
223 D.H. Bayley, Police function, structure, and control in Western Europe and North America: Comparative and Historical
Studies, 1 Crime & Just. 109, 113 (1979).
224 ROBERT C. WADHAM & WILLIAM THOMAS ALLISON, TO PROTECT AND TO SERVE: A HISTORY OF POLICE
IN AMERICA, at xi (2004) (“[T]he development of American policing is filled with paradigm shifts ….”); accord
THE FUTURE OF POLICE (Jennifer Brown, ed. 2014) (examining current understandings of policing’s function).
225 SAMUEL WALKER, POPULAR JUSTICE: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 51-52 (2d ed. 1998).
226 Philip L. Reichel, Southern slave patrols as a transitional police type, 7 AM. J. POLICE 51, 51-53 (1988).
227 Sandra Bass, Policing space, policing race: Social control imperatives and police discretionary decisions, 28 SOC. JUST. 156,
161 (2001); WADHAM & ALLISON, supra note 224, at 41 (noting that after the Civil war, “modern principles of
220
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there were no criteria for becoming a police officer—only “having the right political
connections”—and no training for the job.228 Urban police undertook a vast hodgepodge
range of activities “unexpected by their original creators,” including returning lost children,
shooting stray dogs, enforcing sanitation laws, inspecting boilers, and conducting censuses.229
Their roles were also shaped by national events. We have already seen hints of how
Prohibition influenced Fourth Amendment in cases such as Carroll.230Policing more generally
changed character both with Prohibition, and also with the early twentieth century “rise of a
national security apparatus to ward off external threats and the churn of disorder from
anarchists and criminals.”231
It was only in the post-World War II years that “police professionalism” emerged as
a dominant approach, with some departments making “notable progress in raising
recruitment and training standards.” 232 Part of the professionalism movement was a
resistance to having police undertake tasks other than crime control. 233 Advocates of
professionalism argued for a more centralized, quasi-military structures. As a result, the
twentieth century saw changes to police typical command structures, to their core routine
tasks (e.g., the decline of foot patrols in favor of motorized patrols; specialization by unit
within larger police forces); to their information systems, and to their demographic
composition. 234 This is not to say professionalism was an unqualified success. To the
contrary, professionalized police proved quite “unable to respond” to the civil rights
movement’s demands for racial justice. 235 The “primarily reactive” character of
professionalized policing yielded to an embrace of community policing therefore in the
1960s. 236 Today, policing is changing once again as new big-data technologies alter its
deployment, and even its aims.237 It seems plausible that in a decade or two, what it means to
be police will once again be fundamentally quite different.

police officer discipline and discretion” did not apply in the south, but “the work of the slave patrols evolved
into the primary purpose of Southern police”).
228 WALKER, supra note 225, at 54-55.
229 Eric H. Monkonnen, History of Urban Policing, 15 CRIME & JUST. 547, 554 (1992)
230 WALKER, supra note 225, at 158-62; see also supra text accompanying notes 92 to 95 (discussing origins of the
automobile search exception).
231 SARAH IGO, THE KNOWN CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF PRIVACY IN MODERN AMERICA 48 (2018).
232 WALKER, supra note 225, at 170; FOGELSON, supra note 203, at 167-92; WADHAM & ALLISON, supra note
224, at 82-85; see also David Alan Sklansky, Police and Democracy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1699, 1742 (2005). For a
critique of the professionalism movement as “naïve,” see BITTNER, supra note 194, at 361-63.
233 William H. Parker, The Police Challenge in Our Great Cities, 291 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 5, 7-8
(1954).
234 Albert J. Reiss, Police Organization in the Twentieth Century, 15 CRIME & JUST. 51, 59-60 (1992).
235 WALKER, supra note 225, at 173.
236 James J, Willis, A Recent History of Police, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POLICE AND POLICING (Michael
D. Reisig & Robert J. Kane, eds. 2014); see also LINDA S. MILLER & KÄREN M. HESS, COMMUNITY POLICING:
PARTNERSHIPS FOR PROBLEM SOLVING 20 (4th ed. 2005) (finding that by 2000, some 87 percent of forces in
the United States had adopted some kind of community policing).
237 Aziz Z. Huq, Racial Equity in Algorithmic Criminal Justice, 68 DUKE L.J. – (forthcoming 2019) (summarizing
trends). For a survey of non-algorithmic, empirical tools used by policing of late, see Lawrence W. Sherman,
The Rise of Evidence-Based Policing: Targeting, Testing, and Tracking, 42 CRIME & JUST. 377 (2013).

- 41 Electroniccopy
copyavailable
available at:
at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3224455
Electronic
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3224455

Given the historical contingency of the policing function, it should be no surprise
that policing organizations now take highly varied forms, 238 much as they have taken
divergent forms over time. 239 The fiscal resources available for the policing of similar
populations in different parts of the United States can also differ by an order or
magnitude.240 This variance in underlying fiscal realities directly impinges on the style and
manner of policing. In Ferguson, Missouri, to pick a well-publicized example court fines and
fees were the second largest source of municipal income; as a consequence of this reliance,
in 2013 Ferguson’s municipal court issued some 32,975 arrest warrants for nonviolent
offenses against its population of around 21,000.241 Ferguson is not unique in its reliance on
fines and fees generated by policing activity. 242 But because not all jurisdictions follow
Ferguson’s example, it is erroneous to think about policing as a monolithic species of
behavior. Rather, it is to be expected that policing strategies will vary greatly between
diffident jurisdictions depending on their policing histories, racial composition.
4.

Implications for Fourth Amendment Gloss

A consideration of the political economic, information-gathering practices, and both
historical and also current heterogeneity of policing undermines the case for Fourth
Amendment gloss. Indeed, it suggests that all three ways in which gloss has been deployed—
as substance, as benchmark, and as substitute—should be abandoned. To begin with, the
objections raised in this section suggest that official practice should not be employed as
substantive content in the Fourth Amendment context. The political economy,
informational, and historical perspectives on policing practices are inconsistent with the
conclusion that policing will necessarily involve cost-justified measures. Stable and
commonly used forms of policing, such as the warrantless misdemeanor stop or the
warrantless vehicular search, cannot be reliably evaluated as cost-justified merely because
they have a long historical pedigree and because they are commonly used today. In the
absence of incentives or institutions to root out inefficient tactics, there is no reason to think
the stock of enduring policing practices will include only cost-justified measures.243
These three critiques also suggest a limit to the utility of gloss as benchmark. To be
sure, the mere existence of historical and synchronic variance in policing practices244 is not

PETER K. MANNING, POLICING CONTINGENCIES 43-45 (2003) (documenting variations).
WADHAM & ALLISON, supra note 224, at 15 (“A modern police department and a nineteenth century
department may not seem comparable at first glance.”).
240 David Thacher, The Distribution of Police Protection, 27 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 275, 291 (2010)
(noting disparities, and measuring the extent to which they are dampened by federal subsidies).
241 Policing and Profit, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1723, 1724 (2015); see also DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, THE FERGUSON
REPORT 17-25 (2015) (“City officials have consistently set maximizing revenue as the priority for Ferguson’s
law enforcement activity.”).
242 Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanor Decriminalization, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1055, 1098 (2015) (noting that “many
lower courts and municipalities depend heavily on revenues from fines and fees imposed on minor offenders”).
243 Many of these critiques apply also to equilibrium accounts of the Fourth Amendment, see Kerr, Equilibrium
Adjustment, supra note 179, at 480.
244 See supra text accompanying notes 161 to 162.
238
239

- 42 Electroniccopy
copyavailable
available at:
at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3224455
Electronic
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3224455

alone enough to preclude an inference from gloss, as Evenwel v. Abbott suggested.245 And at
first blush, it would seem to invite the benchmarking inquiry. But as Masur and Posner have
pointed out in the administrative law context, the mere fact that there is variance among
regulated entities does not mean that it is possible to isolate cost-justified tactics merely by
eliminating some outlier practices.246 In both the regulatory and the policing context, it may
well be that an overwhelming majority of regulated entities are engaged in actions that are
cost-unjustified. In the policing context, indeed, this seems quite likely. If almost all police
department are dominated by unions, use performance metrics that are misleading proxies
for cost-justified policies (such as the volume of arrests), and fail to acquire or analyze even
basic performance-related data, then I think we should be skeptical of Fourth Amendment
gloss as a measure of minimally good policing.
Worse, when the Court makes that assumption in cases such as Mapp v. Ohio247 and
Tennessee v. Garner,248 we might be concerned that the imprimatur of constitutional approval is
so persuasive to officials and the public that it ends reform conversations prematurely. Gloss
as benchmarking, that is, may not only be based on a false premise of epistemic competence.
It may also simultaneously dangerously enervate local reform impetus.
Historical change in the objects and social understandings of policing, moreover,
poses challenges to the Court’s endorsement of new practices, such as DNA testing in
Maryland v. King, on the theory that they are genealogically rooted in established practices,
such as fingerprinting.249 The Court’s gloss analogy omits important details that might cast
doubt on the strength of the normative inference that can be drawn from historical
identification practices. Hence, it does not mention that fingerprinting was initially adopted
by the FBI, and then by police departments, as a way to manage the new “racially
unfamiliar” masses perceived as a menace to early twentieth-century American society.250
Nor does it mention the resistance to fingerprinting as a new intrusion on privacy. In 1920, a
Cleveland, OH, ordinance mandating fingerprinting, for example, generated a cab drivers’
strike, with hundreds manning “antifingerprint picket lines.”251 The King Court’s analysis
instead assumed that fingerprinting is now and always has been a neutral, technocratic
measure with no racial overtones and no popular resistance. But with more history in mind,
DNA sampling may be understood in different terms. Like fingerprinting, its initial use may
have racially disparate effects.252 The earlier discomfort with sharing fingerprints may be
Evenwel v. Abbott, 136 S. Ct. 1120 (2016); see supra text accompanying note 34.
Masur & Posner, supra note 119, at 30-33.
247 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
248 471 U.S. 1 (1985)
249 Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 459 (2013) (affirming touchstone of reasonableness); see supra text
accompanying notes 115 to 116.
250 SIMON A. COLE, SUSPECT IDENTITIES: A HISTORY OF FINGERPRINTING AND CRIMINAL IDENTIFICATION
3, 119-20 (2001).
251 CHRISTIAN PARENTI, THE SOFT CAGE: SURVEILLANCE IN AMERICA: FROM SLAVERY TO THE WAR ON
TERROR 43-60 (2004).
252 Erin Murphy, License, Registration, Cheek Swab: DNA Testing and the Divided Court, 127 HARV. L. REV. 161, 189
(2013) (developing the concern about how DNA testing of arrestees will interact with the “highly
disproportionate enforcement of especially low-level offenses”).
245
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paralleled today by a similar discomfort with sharing DNA today.253 The Court’s failure to
account for these historical parallels—which would undermine its use of gloss to support
lower Fourth Amendment protections against DNA collection in King—suggest that its use
of gloss is both descriptively and normatively problematic.254
Finally, many of these same criticisms can be extended to gloss as substitute. In
particular, the variance in the quality of police departments and the likely persistence of
many costly and hence unjustified policing practices undermine the rationales for across-theboard remedial withdrawal by the Court in Hudson v. Michigan255 or Herring v. United States.256 If
police practice is often cost-unjustified, if assumptions about police expertise are muddled
and in conflict with the facts, and if the wide variance in police departments precludes broad
generalizations, the citationless reliance of the Court Hudson and Herring on a happy story of
ever-increasing professionalism is unjustified and perhaps even irresponsible.
The Burkean case for Fourth Amendment gloss, therefore, fails. Whether viewed
across time, or just today, official police practice cannot be taken as a normative justified
gloss relevant to the Fourth Amendment’s interpretation.
C.

Fourth Amendment Gloss as Settlement

The use of gloss as settlement turns on the social value of a stable, clear, and readily
available focal point to facilitate coordination and evaluation of government behavior in light
of constitutional standards. Because a constitutional focal point can usefully be derived from
well-known historical practice, gloss provides a logical, low-cost coordinating point to
generate a stable constitutional equilibrium. A focal point plays one function for officials,
who are tasked with coordinating their activities within the frame of constitutional
institutions. It has a different function for citizens, who can use gloss to evaluate whether
state actors remain faithful to the original compact. In addition, a case for gloss as a well
publicized and readily referenced benchmark of constitutionality can be derived
independently of any assertion about the quality, or epistemic content, of official practice.

For some evidence of that discomfort, see Carpenter v. United States, -- S. Ct. --, 2018 WL 3073916, at *56
(June 22, 2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (discussing governmental acquisition of DNA from third parties as
something that would violate reasonable expectations of privacy).
254 Judicial opinions can also be responses to problems that are unmentioned in the text of the opinion, but that
important chapters in American policing. The failure to understand these hidden transcripts can lead to
systematic error in glossing cases. David Sklansky has demonstrated, for example, that Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347 (1967), responded “to the widespread use of a particularly troubling investigative technique, unrelated
to telephone eavesdropping, without ever mentioning the technique itself. The technique was patrolling for
homosexual sodomy by spying on men in toilet stalls.” David Alan Sklansky, “One Train May Hide Another”:
Katz, Stonewall, and the Secret Subtext of Criminal Procedure, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 875, 879 (2008). This
understanding puts new light on the idea of “reasonable” expectations of privacy, yet Sklansky’s vital insight is
largely missed in the current scholarship.
255 547 U.S. 586 (2006).
256 555 U.S. 135 (2009).
253
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The focal point model of constitutional enforcement closely fits the original function
of the Fourth Amendment. At its core, the focal point model concerns a central problem of
political theory: A sovereign must “retain sufficient political support” to remain stable, but in
order to do so must persuade citizens that it is not abusing its delegated authorities.257
Because citizens can disagree on what constitutes abuse, they face a coordination dilemma:
Unless there is agreement on the legitimate bounds of the state, they will be unable to act
together to limit state abuses. Focal points “resolve [such] coordination dilemmas about the
appropriate limits on the state,” often in terms that generally redound to the benefit of
political “elites,” who are central to political contestation and opposition.258 The focal point
theory can be profitably read in tandem with Ran Hirschl’s influential theory of
constitutional design as “hegemonic preservation.”259 On this view, elites maintain wealth
and privileges even after ceding political power in a constitutional moment by crafting
negative rights that limit the newly formed state.260
As originally conceived, the Fourth Amendment is plausibly viewed as a solution to
precisely this problem of elite coordination over the “appropriate limits of state power.” The
two English legal precedents that provided the impetus and template for that provision
hinged on state efforts to use home searches to harass and disrupt political opponents.
These aversive precedent both involved civil actions by opposition parliamentarians
challenging searches of homes and offices by agents of the secretary of state in search of
evidence of sedition.261 Seditious libel investigations often relied upon “general searches for
documentary evidence.”262 Given this history of policing political dissent though “paper
searches,”263 it is eminently sensible for political elites to agree to the Fourth Amendment.
Anticipating the prospect of time in opposition, those elites could look to the Fourth
Amendment as a protection against the specific instrument of political oppression that (to
their minds) was most immediately available and effective. The Amendment is thus “really
about the protection of political dissent,”264 with gloss providing the focal point for social
coordination in the event that elected leaders target such dissent.

Weingast, supra note 64, at 246.
Id. (“To the extent that solutions to the coordination dilemma occur, it is elites who construct them, often
through pacts.”).
259 RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW
CONSTITUTIONALISM 11 (2004); see also MICHEL ROSENFELD, THE IDENTITY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
SUBJECT: SELFHOOD, CITIZENSHIP, CULTURE, AND COMMUNITIES 185-209 (2010) (developing a notion of
“pacted constitutionalism” pursuant to which powerful interest groups treat the constitution as a coordinated
truce).
260 HIRSCHL, supra note 259, at 89-97.
261 See Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell's State Trials 1029, 1066, 1073 (CP 1765); Wilkes v. Wood, 98 Eng. Rep.
489 (C.P. 1763), 19 Howell's State Trials 1153; see also William Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure,
105 YALE L. J. 393, 396-403 (1995) [hereinafter “Stuntz, Substantive Origins”] (discussing the significance of
Wilkes and Entick).
262 ANDREW E. TASLITZ, RECONSTRUCTING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: A HISTORY OF SEARCH AND
SEIZURE, 1789-1868, at 18 (2006).
263 Entick, 19 Howell's State Trials at 1066, 1073 (noting that papers are a person’s “dearest property; and are so
far from enduring a seizure, that they will hardly bear an inspection”).
264 Stuntz, Substantive Origins, supra note 261, at 447.
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If gloss as settlement explains well the original thrust of the Fourth Amendment, it
does little to explain the clause’s operation now. The English precedents are a gloss that has
largely been abandoned. The Court briefly resurrected the “paper searches” rule at the end
of the nineteenth century in Boyd v. United States.265 Boyd, however, proved to have a limited
shelf life, and is not longer compelling as a Fourth Amendment precedent.266 As a result, the
fact that a search incident to arrest yields intimate papers, such as a diary, rather than
narcotics would have no bearing on the resulting analysis.
Contemporary Fourth Amendment law sharply diverges from the model of gloss as
settlement. To begin with, settlement implies a static model of official practice that can be
used as basis for drawing a Fourth Amendment law. But when Fourth Amendment gloss is
used as a benchmark or a substitute, official practice has not been treated as static and
unchanging. Rather, the Court treats such practice as dynamic, varying between jurisdictions
and over time. It is only when gloss is used as substantive content that the settlement
explanation is even available: Longstanding practices accepted as baseline for lawful searches
and seizures might provide focal points for individuals, unschooled in the law, to signal that
government was overstepping its authority.
And yet the Court has not deployed gloss as substantive content in ways that
facilitate coordination among citizens when government oversteps constitutional bounds.
The primary examples of gloss as substantive content, to the contrary, concern the
authorization of practices such as warrantless arrests based on misdemeanors and warrantless
searches of automobiles. 267 Neither of these lines of cases provides citizens with clear
information about the limits of state power. To the extent that they rely on gloss as
settlement, Atwater, Watson, Carroll, and their progeny might be understood as focal points
for police who are uncertain of their authority. These decisions provide a license for such
officers to rely on longstanding policing habits and practices without reflecting on their
constitutionality. The cases in which I have identified gloss as substantive content probably
lower the cost of policing. They enable junior officers to rely on the intuitions and habits of
older officers. All else being equal, these cases allow police to rest on traditional practices.
They drain law enforcement’s incentive to innovate and learn—and, at least to the extent
that the Court has become primary regulator of the police268—they undermine the incentive
to innovate and improve policing. It is hard to see how this can be justified as a normative
matter in the name of settlement.
This is not to say that no paths of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence operate as focal
points for potentially effective social coordination in response to state illegality. The Court
has repeatedly flagged a “basic principle of Fourth Amendment law … that searches and
116 US 616, 633 (1886) (holding that any “seizure of a man's private books and papers” violated the Fourth
(and Fifth) Amendment).
266 See Eric Schnapper, Unreasonable Searches and Seizures of Papers, 71 VA. L. REV. 869, 915-23 (1985) (analyzing,
and decrying, post-Boyd changes to the law).
267 See supra text accompanying notes 85 to 98.
268 The role of the Court looms large because relevant “legislation is episodic.” Barry Friedman & Maria
Ponomarenko, Democratic Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1827, 1844 (2015).
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seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable.” 269 Home
exceptionalism under the Fourth Amendment, however, is not based on any historical
practice. Rather, it seems to be predicated on an inchoate sense that homes are distinctive as
a cultural or normative matter.270 These cases sound more in “a nostalgia subsidy for home
ownership” rather than any understanding of what has historically operated as an effective
policing.271
In sum, the settlement function of the law is not well served by the current doctrine.
Although the historical practice that once provided the touchstone of the Court’s analysis
could have provided an effectual focal point, the Court has abandoned that practice as a
doctrinal pivot. Its turn to other forms of entrenched policing practice cannot be justified on
settlement grounds. Indeed, to the extent the Court has become a dominant regulator of
national, state, and local law enforcement, its adopt of gloss as settlement likely engenders
worse rather than better policing by crowding out other reform efforts.
*
*
*
Gloss has been an unacknowledged, if important, element of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. It shapes the law of misdemeanor arrests, traffic stops, deadly force, the scope
of the suppression remedy. My aim in this Part has been to show that the justifications for
these deployments of official practice in the Fourth Amendment domain are thin and
unpersuasive. Separation-of-powers scholars have shown that there are persuasive general
reasons for relying on interbranch interactions to formulate constitutional rules. Some of
these reasons spill naturally over into federalism, a congruent domain of structural
constitutional law. But none of the three justifying accounts of gloss as acquiescence,
Burkean wisdom, or settlement can explain the use of official practice to define search and
seizure minima. Such reliance cannot be explained on the standard grounds for folding in
official practice into constitutional law.272 Fourth Amendment gloss, in short, is a practice
that stands on fragile theoretical ground.
IV.

The Future of Fourth Amendment Gloss

If the justifications for Fourth Amendment gloss fail, what consequences should this
have for the actual doctrine? This Part explains first why Fourth Amendment gloss will
persist notwithstanding its lack of firm normative foundation. Powerful institutional and
ideological motives sustain the judicial practice, I contend, even in the absence of a
persuasive normative justification. In practical terms, this means the problem of Fourth

Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006) (quoting Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 559 (2004)); accord
Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 459 (2011)
270 Cf. Stephanie M. Stern, The Inviolate Home: Housing Exceptionalism in the Fourth Amendment, 95 CORNELL L.
REV. 905, 913 (2010) (describing the home as a “sacred” site (quoting Wilson v Layne, 526 US 603, 612 (1999)).
271 Aziz Z. Huq, How the Fourth Amendment and the Separation of Powers Rise (and Fall) Together, 83 U. CHI. L. REV.
139, 157 (2016)
272 Might there be other wholly new theoretical grounds for using gloss that obtain in the Fourth Amendment
context, but not elsewhere? This is theoretically possible, but I can imagine no such grounds at present.
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Amendment gloss is best thought of as a “second best problem.”273 Assuming that the Court
will not switch to the optimal epistemological strategy of limited and careful reliance on
official, police practice, it raises the question whether there measures that can be adopted to
constrain the resulting welfare loss. In the concluding section of this Part, I therefore
consider steps to cabin the deleterious effect of Fourth Amendment gloss’s place in the
jurisprudence.
A.

The Peculiar Persistence of Gloss

Since it lacks compelling normative foundations, why does gloss persist as a central
tenet of Fourth Amendment analysis? The Court does not explain why it employs gloss. So
it is necessary to infer the Justices’ reasons for relying on official practice by drawing on
circumstantial evidence. I offer two hypotheses for why gloss has come to play so large a
role in the jurisprudence.
The first reason for judicial deference to gloss is quite simple: The Supreme Court
has been tacking rightward since the beginning of the 1970s and President Nixon’s explicit
commitment to appoint Justices who shared his views on crime. 274 Today, the Court’s
median lies far to the right of where it has been for most of the twentieth century.275
Whatever one thinks of this ideological status quo, it should be no surprise that the Justices
are heavily disinclined to challenge the authority and competence of the police. Ideological
preferences no doubt make the institutional reasons for folding gloss into Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence more compelling. Hence, they are likely to amplify the neutral
grounds that all judges have for deference to longstanding police practice.
The second hypothesis turns on institutional reasons. Constitutional jurisprudence is
not formulated in the abstract. It is shaped and channeled by its institutional circumstances,
and in particular by the priorities of the judiciary as an institution. The federal courts have
“accreted gradually a great deal of autonomous discretion to pursue institutional interests”
by lobbying Congress, by securing functional autonomy from immediate legislative control,
and by crafting doctrinal rules. 276 Hence, it has room to pursue those interests. Those
The formal theorem of the second-best states that “if there is introduced into a general equilibrium system a
constraint which prevents the attainment of one of the Paretian conditions [i.e., the circumstances that generate
Pareto optimal outcomes], the other Paretian conditions, although still attainable, are, in general, no longer
desirable.” R.G. Lipsey & K. Lancaster, The General Theory of the Second Best, 24 REV. ECON. STUD. 11, 11 (1956).
Strictly speaking, the theory of the second-best implies that deviations from optimality undermine the
possibility of firm prescriptions. Aziz Z. Huq, Structural Constitutionalism As Counterterrorism, 100 CAL. L. REV.
887, 905 (2012). More modestly, the theory implies that when institutions are imperfect, a range of possible
countervailing adjustments must be considered.
274 KEVIN J. MCMAHON, NIXON'S COURT 3-4 (2011); Jon Gottschall, Carter's Judicial Appointments: The Influence of
Affirmative Action and Merit Selection on Voting on the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 67 JUDICATURE 164, 168 (1983).
275 Cf. Alicia Parlapiano and Karen Yourish, Where Neil Gorsuch would fit on the Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, Feb 1,
2017, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/01/31/us/politics/trump-supreme-court-nominee.html.
276 Aziz Z. Huq, Judicial Independence and the Rationing of Constitutional Remedies, 65 DUKE L.J. 1, 53 (2015)
[hereinafter “Huq, Judicial Independence”]; see also David Fontana & Aziz Z. Huq, Institutional Loyalties in
Constitutional Law, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 7–8 (2018) (enumerating institutions in which institutional interests
have prevailed over immediate ideological concerns).
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interests, moreover, may illuminate many doctrinal decisions with cross-partisan support,
decisions that appear otherwise mysterious.277
The Supreme Court depends on police for the implementation of its Fourth
Amendment rules. When the Court announces a rule that governs street-level police,
enforcement of that rule depends initially on whether officers truthfully report compliance
or noncompliance. Much policing practice is embedded not in formal rules but in “tacit”
routines,278 which are hard for outsiders to grasp or evaluate. If departmental management
have difficulty determining what happens in the context of dispersed, highly discretionary
police-citizen encounters,279 federal courts are unlikely to do better. Indeed, evidence of
pervasive misrepresentation by police in suppression hearings suggests an additional barrier
to judicial enforcement.280 Federal courts, further, would have some difficulty tamping down
on pervasive misbehavior by police. In effect, their physical and institutional removal from
police (who are mostly state and local employees) means that they must rely on indirect and
highly imperfect measures, such as suppression and damages remedies, to elicit needful
incentives among the police. Both of these remedies also curb local governments’ efficacy as
a guarantor of public safety. Remediation thus comes bundled with its own negative
spillovers. Further, it exposes the courts to political criticism. Hence, the courts are under
some pressure to curtail and control Fourth Amendment rights because of the institutional
costs of Fourth Amendment remediation.281
To this end, it is in the institutional interest of the federal judiciary to find an
accommodation—a modus vivendi of sorts—with the police. The judicial embrace of gloss
can be usefully understood as one element of that accommodation. One reason for
accommodation is the brute force of familiarity. Anna Lvovsky has observed that “judges
routinely engage in a casual form of systemic factfinding, synthesizing their discrete
encounters with officers in multiple sites of the justice system [with police] into broader
assumptions about police competence.”282 Lvovsky’s explanation may be most plausible for
judges who have moved up through the judicial hierarchy. It may have less explanatory force
for Justices of the Supreme Court. The latter are quite removed from the daily dynamics of
district court litigation, especially after years and decades confined in the marble precincts of
the apex tribunal. In my view, the emergence of Fourth Amendment gloss is best
Huq, Judicial Independence, supra note 276, at 53-56 (developing this point).
On the notion of tactic understandings, see Michael Polanyi, The logic of tacit inference, 41 PHILOSOPHY 1, 2-3
(1966).
279 See supra text accompanying notes 193 to 194.
280 Christopher Slobogin, Testilying: Police Perjury and What To Do About It, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 1037, 1042-44
(1996) (discussing a number of related types of police misconduct in connection with Fourth Amendment
requirements, including police perjury at suppression hearings and at trial, misstatements in police reports, and
fraudulent representations in sworn warrant applications).
281 Formal law and economics work models judicial oversight as a solution to an agency cost problem faced by
the public that employ police, and that face the risk of creating police forces with excessively punitive
incentives. Dhammika Dharmapala, Nuno Garoupa, & Richard H. McAdams, Punitive Police? Agency Costs, Law
Enforcement, and Criminal Procedure, 45 J. LEGAL STUD. 105, 106-07 (2016). The point here is that judicial
oversight of the police embeds its own agency slack problem.
282 Lvovsky, supra note 20, at 2079.
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understood in terms of the pressure on the courts as an institution to cabin Fourth
Amendment remedies, a pressure that obtains even if a judge has not had a career moving
up through the judicial hierarchy.
Gloss purchases breathing room for judges from the costs of Fourth Amendment
remediation (and perhaps because this breathing room is not needed as acutely in respect to
other constitutional rights, we do not see gloss being used with frequency outside the Fourth
Amendment to other elements of the Bill of Rights). By demonstrating respect and
endorsement of familiar policing tools, courts mitigate the potential for conflict with
regulated actors. By making it easier to maintain police “folkways,”283 the courts purchase a
measure of credibility that perhaps makes other rules easier to enforce. If courts do not have
other rules they wish to see enforced against police, they have neutralized the possibility of
pushback from police and their political allies.284
Although institutional and ideological grounds are unlikely to be formally recognized,
they are likely to have powerful shaping effects on the doctrine. The survival of gloss as a
central element of Fourth Amendment law is one of them.
B.

The Mitigation of Gloss’s Costs

The standard account of why Fourth Amendment law falls short focuses on the
limits of the courts’ institutional competence. 285 An implication of my analysis is that
problem lies as much in the sources upon which judges rely, as the institutional limitations of
the federal courts themselves. There is nothing that prevents the federal judiciary from
examining official practice more closely and critically; nothing prevents Justices who do not
obtain a majority, or who are preparing an opinion that points out weaknesses in an opinion
of the Court, from highlighting the limits of policing practice. The federal judiciary might be
an effective shield against unreasonable searches and seizures; it has simply chosen not to
play this function. With that in mind, four general lessons might be drawn to blunt the errorgenerating effects of gloss in this domain. These lessons are less costly to implement than a
full-scale abatement of gloss arguments; hence, they are at least plausible reform proposals
given the institutional and ideological dynamics I have identified.
First, it is a mistake for scholars and citizens to conclude that Fourth Amendment
minima represent even cost-justified policing measures. Even common measures, such as
warrantless misdemeanor arrests, 286 may be unjustified simply because their crimesuppression benefits are smaller than the social good possible if police invest their time
Andrew D. Leipold, Objective Tests and Subjective Bias: Some Problems of Discriminatory Intent in the Criminal Law,
73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 559, 594 (1998) (“Police departments and prosecutor's offices have folkways and
patterns of behavior ….”).
284 For an illuminating discussion of how police unions in California have mobilized against that state’s
Supreme Court, see Katherine J. Bies, Let the Sunshine in: Illuminating the Powerful Role Police Unions Play in Shielding
Officer Misconduct, 28 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 109, 130-32 (2017).
285 See, e.g., Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 268, at 1865 (“Even in the case of traditional, investigative
policing, judicial review fails to do its job, the result of which is countless unremedied rights violations.”).
286 Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 323 (2001).
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otherwise. 287 If it is to operate as a source of Fourth Amendment law, judges should
acknowledge that gloss should never be sufficient in isolation to vindicate a proposed search
or seizure. This intuition is not wholly missing from the Court’s approach. In cases such as
Riley v. California, for example, the majority opinion declined to assume that a practice was
cost-justified merely because some analog to the practice had long been employed by
police.288 The need for judicial consideration of costs and benefits should not be limited to
instances of technological change. All policing tactics are technologies in the most general
sense. All were once new. If no court has ever engaged in the sort of careful analysis that
characterized the Riley Court’s approach, there is simply no reason to assume that
longstanding practice is wise or cost-justified.
Second, and more ambitiously, judges should accept gloss solely if accompanied
either by evidence that the policy is in fact cost-justified, or that it was adopted through a
process whereby its likely costs have been recognized and acknowledged. This can take two
forms. First, judges might accept freestanding evidence that a proposed policing measure is
cost effective. Police now rarely generate such data.289 Calibrating the deference accorded to
different policing measures based on their empirical support is one way to incentivize the
production of such evidence. In the interim, however, police are not without recourse.
Criminologists have generated an impressive body of empirical scholarship about the kinds
of policing measures that produce gains in public safety that outweigh the costs externalized
onto citizens.290 A judicial demand for the epistemic basis of search and seizure measures
could also serve the salutary information-forcing function of eliciting more such studies. The
latter are a public good. As such, they are likely produced at suboptimal rates.
An alternative to this approach would be follow Barry Friedman and Maria
Ponomarenko’s proposal to “defer to police decisions about enforcement methods only to
the extent that those decisions represent considered, fact-based judgments formulated with
democratic input.”291 Friedman and Ponomarenko’s proposal is not free of ambiguity. On
the one hand, their demand for “fact-based judgments” seems to require that the policies
adopted by police reach a certain quality threshold. On the other hand, they contend that
“Courts need not judge the police, at least in the first instance. They need only assure that
someone is filling the regulatory void.”292 In my view, the process by which a policy is
generated is an imperfect proxy for the quality of the policy itself. Where courts can ascertain

See supra text accompanying note 185 to 186.
134 S. Ct. 2473, 2495 (2014).
289 See supra text accompanying note 217. States such as Washington have generated benefit-cost evaluations of
policing tactics. Steve Aos, Polly Phipps, Robert Barnoski, and Roxanne Lieb, The comparative costs and benefits of
programs to reduce crime: A review of research findings with implications for Washington State, in COSTS AND BENEFITS OF
PREVENTING CRIME 149 (Brandon Welsh, ed., 2000).
290 For a recent survey, see Lum & Nagin, supra note 197, at 344. For a compelling analysis of best practices in
street policing, see Anthony A. Braga et al. The Effects of Hot Spot Policing on Crime: An Updated Systemic Review and
Meta-Analysis, 31 JUST. Q. 633, 640 (2014).
291 Friedman & Maria Ponomarenko, supra note 268, at 1892.
292 Id.
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when a policing measure is likely to be cost-justified, I am not sure why they should fall back
on the second-best proxy of procedure.293
Third, in other constitutional domains, the Court has acknowledged that formally
neutral policies can be rooted historically in invidious beliefs about regulated populations.294
In the policing context, the Court has not evaluated long-standing practices in light of their
racialized origins. It has not considered, for example, the relationship between vagrancy laws
and programmatic stop and frisk. Nor has it questioned whether its endorsement on
professionalized policing in decisions such as Hudson and Herring is also an endorsement of
the racial politics of professional policing as originally articulated in the 1950s.295 Courts
should recognize the racial origins of many policing measures, and consider whether those
origins are consistent with the assumption of Burkean wisdom or acquiesced-to settlement.
Doing so would be a return to, rather than a break from tradition. In the interwar years, the
Court faced several “egregious exemplars of Jim Crow justice,” and used those extreme facts
as the basis for “landmark criminal procedure rulings” with the aim of limiting the excesses
of Jim Crow criminal justice.296
Finally, the case against a mechanistic reliance on gloss is at its acme in cases such as
Riley and Carpenter v. United States, which concern new technologies.297 Given the variance in
the historical functions and present capacities of police, claims that there is a functional
continuity between earlier policing tools and new technologies are almost always flawed.
Even when such continuities exist—as in the case of fingerprinting and the DNA analysis
authorized in Maryland v. King298—the Court is prone to miss the most salient ones. At the
same time, the mere fact that a form of information acquisition was unknown before, and
rendered possible by a new technology, should not suffice to signal its unconstitutionality.299
The foundation of Fourth Amendment gloss is sufficiently unstable, and the supply of easy
analogies so compromised that new investigative devices should be judged on their own
terms, not by the unreliable and haphazard project of imagining continuities in the plural,
complex worlds of historical and contemporary policing practice.

Indeed, in other work, Friedman and Ponomarenko have insightfully detailed the ways in which cost-benefit
analysis of policing now falls short, and how it can be improved. Maria Ponomarenko and Barry Friedman,
Benefit-Cost Analysis of Public Safety: Facing the Methodological Challenges, 8 J. BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS 305, 308-16
(2017).
294 See, e.g., Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985) (holding that provision in Alabama Constitution
disenfranchising persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude violated equal protection where, even
though on its face it was racially neutral, original enactment was motivated by desire to discriminate against
blacks).
295 See supra text accompanying note 235 (noting criticisms of professional policing for its insensitivity to racial
concerns).
296 Michael J. Klarman, The Racial Origins of Modern Criminal Procedure, 99 MICH. L. REV. 48, 49 (2000).
297 558 U.S. --, 2018 WL 3073916 (June 22, 2018).
298 569 U.S. 435 (2013); see supra text accompanying notes 250 to 251 (flagging racialized history of
fingerprinting as an investigative tool).
299 Cf. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 420 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring) (noting that it is “almost
impossible” to imagine an analog to GPS vehicle tracking).
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Conclusion
Judicial reliance on ongoing police practice is a commonplace in the Fourth
Amendment doctrine. Yet to date it has been neither theorized nor adequately justified.
Drawing upon analogies to “historical gloss” in structural constitutional law, and “norming”
in the administrative law scholarship, I have argued that the standard grounds for reliance on
observed institutional practice do not extend to the Fourth Amendment context. There is, in
short, no strong normative justification for judicial reliance on police practice to establish
Fourth Amendment rules. To the extent that Fourth Amendment gloss survives, therefore, it
is a mistake whose costs must be mitigated rather than a virtue to be celebrated. The range
of cautionary nudges with which I conclude is necessarily incomplete: Indeed, one
implication of my analysis is that there is much work still to be done thinking through the
complex ways federal courts receive and transform flawed policing practice into the basic
law of the land.
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